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DISPARATE DISCRIMINATION
Leah M. Litman*
This Article explains and analyzes a recent trend in the Supreme Court’s cases
regarding unintentional discrimination, where the argument is that a law has
the effect of producing a disadvantage on members of a particular group. In
religious discrimination cases, the Court has held that a law is presumptively
unconstitutional if the law results in a comparable secular activity being
treated more favorably than religious activity. Yet in racial discrimination
cases, the Court has said the mere fact that a law more severely disadvantages
racial minorities as a group does not suffice to establish unlawful discrimination.
The two tracks for unintentional discrimination claims can be understood
through the lens of political process theory. One part of political process theory
maintains that courts should be skeptical of laws that negatively affect discrete
and insular minorities who may be politically powerless and face prejudice.
One reason the Court more carefully scrutinizes laws that burden conservative, (often) Christian religious groups may be that the Court views those
groups as socially powerless because their views no longer command majority
support and because their views are not treated with the respect the Court
thinks they deserve. And the Court’s decisions have the effect of redistributing
power to or reinforcing power in the groups the Court believes to be socially
powerless.
Identifying the jurisprudential worldview that may plausibly drive these trends
helps to identify the potential implications and assess the merits of the new
doctrinal approach that the Court has taken in (some) antidiscrimination
cases. The Court’s new approach to religious discrimination claims has some
virtues; in particular, the Court is probably right to consider facts from the
private sphere, such as a group’s economic or social power, in deciding the appropriate scope of judicial review. But the selectivity with which the Court has
applied this approach, as well as the Court’s odd assessments of various groups’
power, has resulted in a problematic jurisprudence of conservative victimization that judicially protects backlash against advances in equality and antidiscrimination law.

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Jessica BulmanPozen, Daniel Deacon, Ryan Doerfler, Ruth Greenwood, Don Herzog, Olatunde Johnson, Sasha
Natapoff, Nick Stephanopoulos, and participants in the Harvard Law School Law and Politics
workshop, the Chicago Public Law workshop, and the Columbia Public Law workshop for helpful comments and questions. Thanks to Will Jankowski for helpful research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
There are currently two tracks for unintentional discrimination claims. 1
Say a plaintiff brings a constitutional religious discrimination claim. That
plaintiff would succeed if they showed that a law had the effect of treating a
comparable secular entity more favorably than the law treated the plaintiff’s
religious exercise. But a racial minority who brings a race discrimination claim
must show more. The plaintiff bringing a race discrimination claim would not
win even if a law resulted in greater burdens on racial minorities as a group;
nor would the plaintiff win if a law resulted in a comparable white individual
being treated more favorably than a person of color.
These are the two tracks for so-called unintentional discrimination
claims—claims that do not allege a government decisionmaker intentionally
sought to disadvantage a particular group. The two tracks appeared in the Supreme Court’s October 2020 Term. In Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, the Court held that laws resulting in racially discriminatory effects do
not necessarily violate the Voting Rights Act. 2 (The Court had previously held
such laws do not violate the Constitution.) 3 The Court went out of its way to
say that, in addition to showing that a law results in a significant disparity
between different racial groups (that is, a disparity between all Black voters on
the one hand and all white voters on the other), the plaintiffs had to show that
the burden imposed by the law was severe, that the law “departs
from . . . standard practice,” and that the law does not serve a legitimate, valid
state interest. 4 Yet a little more than a week before Brnovich, the Court concluded that even where a religious entity has not shown that a law results in
religious groups being treated worse than nonreligious groups, the law is still
subject to the most exacting judicial scrutiny and, as a result, likely unconstitutional—in part because the law has the potential to produce discriminatory
effects on religious entities, even if it has not actually done so. 5
The dichotomy between the Court’s racial discrimination and religious
discrimination cases is even more stark with respect to the coronavirus cases
the Court decided on the shadow docket during its October 2020 Term. (The
shadow docket refers to the set of orders and occasional opinions that the justices issue without full briefing and oral argument, often disposing of requests

1. See David Simson, Most Favored Racial Hierarchy: The Ever-Evolving Ways of the Supreme Court’s Superordination of Whiteness, 120 MICH. L. REV. 1629 (2022); cf. Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case
for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145 (2009) (outlining two tracks of sentencing for life-ordeath sentences).
2. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021).
3. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
4. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2338–40.
5. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1878–79 (2021).
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for extraordinary relief, such as stays of lower court opinions or injunctions.)6
Many of these cases fell into two categories—the first were religious liberty
challenges to public health measures designed to contain the spread of
COVID-19, 7 and the second were voting rights challenges to restrictions that
allegedly increased voters’ risk of exposure to the virus. 8
In the cases on religious liberty, the Court adopted a standard that is more
favorable to plaintiffs. The Court held that a plaintiff makes out a presumptive
case of unconstitutional discrimination if a law or policy results in “any comparable secular activity” being treated “more favorably than religious exercise.” 9 Under this standard, plaintiffs do not have to show that a law or policy
treats religious entities as a group worse than secular entities or that a law or
policy results in greater burdens on religious activities than nonreligious ones.
All plaintiffs must establish is that a law or policy leads to a comparable secular
activity being treated more favorably than religious activity. 10 Part of what
makes this new standard so striking is how broadly the Court has defined
“comparable” or “similarly situated” secular activities. It has equated, among
other things, outdoor “camp grounds” with in-home gatherings for religious
exercise, asserting that the government cannot permit people to gather at
camp grounds if it prohibits in-home religious gatherings because the two activities pose a similar risk of COVID-19 transmission. 11 But if outdoor camping and indoor at-home gatherings are comparable for purposes of COVID19 transmission, then the universe of secular activities that courts would treat
as comparable to religious activity is very large and includes many activities
6. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L.
REV. 123, 124–25 (2019); William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 3–5 (2015).
7. Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021) (per curiam); Roman Cath. Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam); S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021) (mem.); High Plains Harvest Church v. Polis, 141 S. Ct. 527
(2020) (mem.); Gateway City Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1460 (2021) (mem.); Gish v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1290 (2021) (mem.); Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 889 (2020)
(mem.).
8. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (per curiam); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020) (mem.); Andino
v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9 (2020) (mem.); Merrill v. People First of Ala., 141 S. Ct. 25 (2020)
(mem.).
9. Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1296 (emphasis omitted).
10. Cf. id. at 1297 (“California treats some comparable secular activities more favorably
than at-home religious exercise, permitting hair salons, retail stores, personal care services,
movie theaters, private suites at sporting events and concerts, and indoor restaurants to bring
together more than three households at a time.”); id. at 1298 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (accusing the
Court of requiring “that the State equally treat apples and watermelons”); Roman Cath. Diocese,
141 S. Ct. at 66 (“[T]he list of ‘essential’ businesses includes things such as acupuncture facilities,
camp grounds, garages, as well as many whose services are not limited to those that can be regarded as essential, such as all plants manufacturing chemicals and microelectronics and all
transportation facilities.”).
11. Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 66–67.
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that may not be all that comparable. And if a law cannot regulate religious
activity if it fails to regulate not-all-that comparable secular activity, then
many laws will be vulnerable to constitutional challenges.
The Court does not use anything like that standard in racial discrimination cases. In racial discrimination cases, plaintiffs must show, among other
things, that a law results in racial minorities, as a group, being treated worse
than whites as a group—not that people of color are treated worse than a particular subset of comparable white individuals. 12 And in constitutional cases,
plaintiffs must show that government officials intended to disadvantage racial
minorities, in addition to showing that a law results in greater disadvantages
on racial minorities. 13
Were the Court to use the standard from religious discrimination cases in
racial discrimination cases, the voters who sought expanded access to absentee
voting during COVID-19 would likely have prevailed. 14 All they would have
needed to show was that a state allowed some white voters (such as elderly
voters or voters with certain health conditions) to vote absentee but did not
provide the same opportunity to racial minorities, who were comparably situated with respect to the state’s interest in the prevention of fraud. 15 In part
because of the low incidence of fraud in absentee voting, as well as how
broadly the Court has defined “comparable” groups in the religious discrimination cases, that showing would not have been particularly difficult to
make. 16 Or consider how the new religious discrimination standard would
work in the employment or housing context, two areas of law that prohibit
some instances of unintentional discrimination. 17 Using the religious discrimination standard, a plaintiff would be able to succeed on an employment discrimination or fair housing claim if they could show that a single, somewhatcomparable white employee or a single, somewhat-comparable white tenant
was treated better than a racial minority (even if unintentionally). 18

12. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2339, 2344–45 (2021); see also
infra Section II.A.2 (discussing coronavirus voting rights cases where the Court ignored district
court findings that voting restrictions would have an adverse effect on racial minorities).
13. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 244–45 (1976); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55 (1980).
14. See Nelson Tebbe, The Principle and Politics of Equal Value, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 2397,
2451–53, 2458 (2021).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 103–107 (questioning whether the Court actually
applies this part of the standard in religious discrimination cases).
16. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., DEBUNKING THE VOTER FRAUD MYTH (2017),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Briefing_Memo_Debunking_Voter_
Fraud_Myth.pdf [perma.cc/K2SK-HHRG].
17. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Disparate Impact, Unified Law, 128 YALE L.J. 1566, 1570
(2019).
18. While some doctrines in antidiscrimination law turn on plaintiffs identifying a comparator, they largely do so in order to ascertain whether there was intentional discrimination.
See infra text accompanying notes 92–93, 126–128.
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This Article offers one theory that can explain the Court’s differential
treatment of religious discrimination and racial discrimination claims. It does
so not to make a definitive claim about what is actually psychologically motivating the justices. Instead, it offers an account that can plausibly explain the
trajectory of the Court’s cases and predict where they may be headed. It tries
to understand the two tracks of unintentional discrimination claims by way of
a comparison and contrast to political process theory, the influential theory
that was supposed to provide a blueprint for judicial review. Political process
theory generally recommends that courts adopt a deferential form of judicial
review except in certain cases, including those in which a law affects a disfavored minority. 19 From its origins, courts and scholars understood the theory
to call for especially close judicial scrutiny of laws and policies that negatively
affect racial minorities. 20 After all, racial minorities have historically been excluded and disadvantaged by the political process, and for various reasons,
they have found it difficult to form successful coalitions in the political process
and to enact their preferred policies into law. 21
It has become passé to note that the modern Court does not follow that
aspect of political process theory. 22 The Court affords the same degree of judicial scrutiny to laws disadvantaging white individuals as it does to laws disadvantaging racial minorities. 23 Based on these cases and others, scholars have
surmised that the Court has not just rejected political process theory but perhaps even inverted it by providing greater protection to majoritarian groups,
or groups that are politically powerful, than to historically disadvantaged minority groups. 24
But there is another, albeit related, way of understanding the dynamic in
the Court’s treatment of unintentional religious discrimination claims in particular. One theory that could explain these cases would be that at least some
of the justices believe certain religious groups, specifically conservative, (often) Christian groups, are socially powerless and subject to rampant discrimination, particularly in the private sphere. That is, the Court might believe that

19. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 747 (1991).
20. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 19, at 135 (pointing to “how our society has treated its black
minority (even after that minority had gained every official attribute of access to the process)”).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term—Foreword: Equality Divided,
127 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2013); Aaron Tang, Reverse Political Process Theory, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1427
(2017); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Anti-Carolene Court, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 111.
23. Siegel, supra note 22, at 31–38.
24. Id. at 9 (“Today, courts reviewing equal protection challenges to facially neutral laws
brought by members of minority groups proceed under law that directs judges to defer to representative government, while courts reviewing equal protection claims brought by members of
majority groups strictly scrutinize challenges to affirmative action.”); Tang, supra note 22, at
1430–31 (arguing that the Court has “afford[ed] special protections via underdetermined constitutional provisions to politically powerful entities that are able to advance their interests full
well in the democratic arena” (emphasis omitted)).
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conservative Christians face a greater risk of social exclusion and subordination than racial minorities do. That belief could explain why the Court would
adopt a presumption that laws resulting in some disadvantage on some religious groups are the product of unconstitutional discrimination, but laws that
result in greater burdens on racial minorities are not—because prejudice and
discrimination against conservative religious groups are more common.
Understood in that light, the Court is not affording heightened judicial
protection to majoritarian groups or the politically powerful as such; it is affording heightened protection to groups that it perceives as either or both socially powerless and subject to widespread discrimination in the present day.
And one indicium that it uses to assess a group’s power seems to be whether
the group’s views are sufficiently well-represented and respected in elite cultural spaces (such as institutions of higher education), popular culture, or on
social media.
This Article makes three contributions. First, it spells out the contours of
the Court’s new religious liberty and religious discrimination jurisprudence
by comparing and contrasting it to recent cases on racial discrimination in
voting. Other scholars have previously argued that the Court has made it easier for plaintiffs in religious discrimination cases (at least religious discrimination cases involving conservative religious groups) to establish
discrimination than for racial minorities to do so. But these pieces, by Jessica
Clarke and Aziz Huq, have largely focused on claims of intentional discrimination. 25 As the cases discussed in this Article show, the trend is the same for
claims of unintentional discrimination. 26 Particularly given the potentially farranging reach of a regime that imposed liability for unintentional discrimination, it is important to understand the contours of the new unintentional discrimination regime. 27
25. Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505 (2018); Aziz Z. Huq, What Is
Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211 (2018) [hereinafter Huq, Discriminatory Intent]; Aziz Z. Huq, Article II and Antidiscrimination Norms, 118 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2019).
26. In Nelson Tebbe’s recent article, The Principle and Politics of Equal Value, Tebbe
frames the new religious liberty cases in terms of a theory of equal value. He defends the theory
but questions the Court’s application of it. Tebbe, supra note 14. This Article focuses more on
identifying and evaluating the premises that may be motivating the Court’s selective and peculiar
application of its new theory, and how those premises ultimately make the current theory unjustifiable. It also argues that the Court’s application of the theory is focused more on effects
than the state’s rationale, and that a focus on effects may be endemic to the theory itself. See infra
text accompanying notes 98–102, 126–143. Steve Vladeck has also argued the Court has refashioned the law of free exercise through opaque and inconsistent procedures on the shadow
docket. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Most-Favored Right: COVID, the Supreme Court, and the (New)
Free Exercise Clause, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 699 (2022). And in a forthcoming paper, Laura
Portuondo agrees the law on free exercise has shifted but argues that equal protection doctrine
should change to match it. Laura Portuondo, Effecting Free Exercise and Equal Protection, 72
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2023). This Article, however, argues that this new theory is unsustainable and unjustified in the free exercise context. See infra Section III.B.2.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 104–133 (discussing implications of a disparate
impact liability regime in religious liberty); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (expressing concern that a disparate impact regime for race would be too “far reaching”).
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Second, unpacking the new frontier of unintentional discrimination
claims destabilizes the boundary between intentional and unintentional discrimination claims. To date, antidiscrimination law has often been framed as
a choice between intentional discrimination claims (where the government
intentionally disadvantages a particular group) and disparate impact claims
(where a law results in unfair or unequal burdens on different groups, but that
was not the purpose or intent behind the law). This Article suggests that is a
false choice and an unnecessary one; there can be different shades of discrimination that blur the boundaries between those two categories. The Court has
not adopted a pure disparate impact standard in the new religious discrimination cases despite the similarities between the new standard for religious
discrimination claims and disparate impact liability. But the Court has also
disavowed the idea that the new standard in religious discrimination cases is
an intentional discrimination standard.
Third, this Article presents a striking jurisprudential worldview that
could plausibly explain the trajectory of the Court’s religious discrimination
cases. Based on the Court’s opinions, individual justices’ writings, as well as
statements the justices have made outside of the Court, this Article suggests
that the justices may be assessing antidiscrimination claims based on an intuition that conservative (often) Christian groups lack certain kinds of social
capital or economic power, which makes them socially powerless, and that
conservative Christian groups face rampant societal discrimination because
their views no longer garner majority popular support, but once did. 28
Identifying this as a potential through line in the Court’s cases helps to
evaluate the cases, understand their potential implications, and assess the
premises of the new antidiscrimination law. Intriguingly, the Court’s new approach to religious liberty and religious discrimination claims reflects some of
the key scholarly criticisms of the Court’s free speech and equal protection
doctrine, where the Court has, incorrectly in many scholars’ views, steadfastly
refused to consider things like social context or economic power in deciding
whether to vary the scope of judicial review. 29
Yet the Court’s new antidiscrimination theory for religious liberty claims
is ultimately unjustified for reasons related both to the theory itself and to the

28. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 107, United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744
(2013) (No. 12-307) (“Chief Justice Roberts: I suppose the sea change has a lot to do with the
political force and effectiveness of people representing, supporting your side of the case?”).
29. E.g., Genevieve Lakier, The First Amendment’s Real Lochner Problem, 87 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1241, 1245 (2020) (“[I]n recent decades the Supreme Court has embraced a highly academic conception of freedom of speech—one that largely fails (and in some contexts, adamantly
refuses) to consider the economic and social forces that as a practical matter shape the exercise
of First Amendment rights.”); see also Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kaczynski & K. Sabeel Rahman, Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the
Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784 (2020) (critiquing doctrine for failure to review
private economic or social arrangements).
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Court’s application of it. The Court mistakenly focuses on a very limited definition of social power and societal discrimination rather than incorporating
these assessments into a broader and more robust inquiry into power and
prejudice. Equally important, the Court’s application of the theory is, at best,
selective, and the selectivity uniformly favors Republican-favored causes.
Part of what makes this potential explanation for the Court’s cases so
striking is that one premise of the Court’s jurisprudential outlook, the idea
that conservative Christians are a group that faces considerable risks of discrimination and exclusion, shares important similarities with a narrative of
victimization that Republican politicians and conservative commentators
have occasionally embraced. 30 The idea is that conservatives, who enjoy substantial political power and various electoral advantages, are a persecuted minority who face societal discrimination and exclusion, at least in certain

30. Republican politicians frequently claim they are targets of censorship on social media.
See, e.g., Mark Moore, Ted Cruz Rips ‘Dangerous’ Google, ‘Brazen’ Twitter over Censorship, Elections, N.Y. POST (Jan. 4, 2021, 4:09 PM), https://nypost.com/2021/01/04/ted-cruz-twitter-mostbrazen-and-google-most-dangerous [perma.cc/N92K-HRQF]; Elizabeth A. Harris & Alexandra Alter, Simon & Schuster Cancels Plans for Senator Hawley’s Book, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/books/simon-schuster-josh-hawley-book.html [perma.
cc/YSU3-SFWV]. Republican commentators make similar claims about censorship on university campuses as well as in society more broadly. See, e.g., Susan Svrluga & Brian Murphy,
Trump Lashes Back at Berkeley After Violent Protests Block Speech by Breitbart Writer Milo
Yiannopoulos, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/gradepoint/wp/2017/02/01/berkeley-cancels-speech-by-breitbrart-writer-milo-amid-intense-protests [perma.cc/KMY4-C6F2]; Alex M. Koller & Taylor C. Peterman, IOP Removes U.S. Rep.
Elise Stefanik ’06 from Senior Advisory Committee, HARV. CRIMSON (Jan. 12, 2021), https://
www.thecrimson.com/article/2021/1/12/iop-removes-stefanik [perma.cc/N5H2-M6RV]. A
Fox & Friends host said that racial justice advocates were “trying to take down . . . white culture”
and had “marginalized” white voices. Harriet Sinclair, Fox Host Rants Minorities Are Trying to
‘Take Down’ White Culture, INDEPENDENT (June 9, 2021, 4:40 PM), https://www.independent.co.
uk/news/world/americas/fox-friends-critical-race-theory-b1862717.html [perma.cc/8T3DYXZM]. Another Fox News host suggested that discussions of racial justice would lead to the
genocide of white Americans. Tucker Carlson: Critical Race Theory Will Lead to the Genocide of
White Americans, MEDIA MATTERS (June 24, 2021, 8:40 PM), https://www.mediamatters.org/foxnews/tucker-carlson-critical-race-theory-will-lead-genocide-white-americans [perma.cc/33K3H5A9]. This narrative of conservative victimization also has troubling historical parallels, including to the resistance to both Reconstruction and the abolition of slavery. As Lawrence Glickman has argued, the resistance to Reconstruction, like the resistance to new antidiscrimination
norms, was also couched in terms of the victimization of white Americans. Lawrence Glickman,
3 Tropes of White Victimhood, ATLANTIC (July 20, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/07/three-tropes-white-victimhood/619463 [perma.cc/E4SC-SG2B]; see also Darren
Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 917 (2009) (documenting this
trend). The resistance also suggested that white Americans had exchanged positions with previous objects of discrimination and were being treated like formerly enslaved Black persons. Glickman, supra.
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circles. 31 This idea has featured prominently in Republican politicians’ critiques of social media platforms and corporate advocacy, and it has also appeared in conservative commentators’ discussions of elite institutions,
particularly schools. 32 There is something odd about the idea that a group that
controls one branch of the federal government, the Supreme Court, is a vulnerable group warranting judicial protection. 33 The premise seems to be that,
despite their political power, conservatives are victims so long as society does
not enthusiastically embrace their views or allow their views to prevail. 34
Any doctrine premised on this worldview will have the effect of judicially
reinforcing backlash against advances in equality and antidiscrimination law.
Consider how some justices have suggested that when government actors, including courts, identify new forms of prohibited discrimination (such as discrimination against LGBTQ individuals), the very act of prohibiting
discrimination leads to discrimination against the group who was engaged in
the now-prohibited form of discrimination. 35 The Court treats the group that
opposed new antidiscrimination protections as a group that warrants heightened judicial protection because their views have fallen out of favor. But that
heightened judicial protection, and the resulting heightened judicial scrutiny
of new antidiscrimination protections, threatens to undo or at least undermine the new antidiscrimination protections.

31. Melissa Murray, Inverting Animus: Masterpiece Cakeshop and the New Minorities,
2018 SUP. CT. REV. 257, 282 (“They are making what amounts to a[] . . . claim that their traditional morals no longer hold sway in majoritarian culture, transforming them into minorities
who face discrimination and subordination in public life.”).
32. E.g., Josh Hawley, It’s Time to Stand Up Against the Muzzling of America, N.Y. POST
(Jan. 24, 2021, 8:22 PM), https://nypost.com/2021/01/24/its-time-to-stand-up-against-the-muzzling-of-america [perma.cc/TMG6-8BGS]; Eric Kaufmann, Political Discrimination as CivilRights Struggle, NAT’L REV. (June 24, 2021, 1:13 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2021/07/12/political-discrimination-as-civil-rights-struggle [perma.cc/KRR9-A9TP] (depicting “political discrimination as [a] civil-rights struggle” and arguing that “conservatives’
resistance to racial, gender, and sexual progressivism mark them as moral deviants . . . leading
to pervasive discrimination against, and censorship of, conservative views” (cleaned up)).
33. See Murray, supra note 31, at 281–82 (“As an initial matter, it is not often that straight
white Protestant men are the imagined subjects of animus. Indeed, in traditional antidiscrimination narratives, such individuals are quite literally ‘The Man’—an individual with significant
social, political, and economic capital and unsurpassed privileges, opportunities, and access.”);
Christopher Kang, Co-Founder and Chief Counsel, Demand Justice, Written Statement to the
Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States (July 20, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Kang-Testimony.pdf [perma.cc/
FPQ4-R73C]; Michael J. Klarman, Professor, Harvard Law School, Written Statement to the Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States (July 15, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Klarman-Testimony.pdf [perma.cc/
TP6U-RXYV].
34. See Glickman, supra note 30 (“In the conservative world, the idea that white people
in the United States are under siege has become doctrine.”).
35. See Murray, supra note 31 (identifying this implicit claim in Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)).
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The trends this Article identifies in the Court’s treatment of religious discrimination claims under the Free Exercise Clause share two important parallels with trends that scholars have identified in the Court’s treatment of
racial discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause. One similarity is that the Court’s equal protection cases have now made it easier for white
plaintiffs to succeed on racial discrimination claims than for racial minorities
to do so, 36 just as the Court’s free exercise cases have made it easier for conservative Christian groups to succeed on religious discrimination claims than
for other, more minority religions to do so. In both contexts, the Court has
shifted the law in ways that invert which groups benefit from the law’s protections. And in both contexts, the group benefiting from those changes is not
the group that has been historically disadvantaged or excluded from obtaining
or exercising political power. The other parallel between the two lines of cases
lies in the reasons why courts have insisted on affording greater protections to
once politically dominant majorities. In both racial discrimination cases and
religious discrimination cases, the Court has suggested that greater judicial
protection may be warranted because a group no longer possesses the kind of
power or capital it once did. 37
In this respect, both sets of cases reflect considerable sympathy and perhaps nostalgia for a not-so-distant past when white conservative Christians
controlled the levers of political and social power to the exclusion of racial
minorities and religious minorities. The Court views with skepticism departures from that past, including where legislatures enact statutes that seek to
include racial minorities in formerly exclusionary institutions or where courts
interpret constitutional guarantees to prohibit the exclusion or subordination
of sexual minorities. 38 Courts treat legislative and judicial efforts that address
historical exclusions as reasons for courts to reinforce the historical exclusions: they view remedial policies or antidiscrimination measures as evidence
that white people, or conservative Christian groups, are now groups in need
of judicial protection from laws that seek to include other groups in society

36. Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151 (2016); Siegel, supra
note 22.
37. On race discrimination claims, see infra text accompanying notes 256–258, 264–266,
and 378–379. See also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 254 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (“Whether described as ‘benign discrimination’ or ‘affirmative action,’ the racial
quota is nonetheless a creator of castes, a two-edged sword that must demean one in order to
prefer another.”); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 673 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing opinion upholding affirmative action plan was “obviously designed to force promoting
officials to prefer candidates from the favored racial and sexual classes”); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557
U.S. 557, 605 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring) (describing city’s decision to scrap employment promotion test that produced disparate racial effects as reflecting “a simple desire to please a politically important racial constituency”). On religious discrimination and sexual orientation
discrimination claims, see supra note 28 and infra text accompanying notes 262–263 and 369–
370.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 256–266, 369–375.

12

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 121:1

and democracy. 39 Surfacing that through line in the Court’s cases helps to
evaluate them.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I outlines political process theory, scholarly criticisms of it, and scholarly accounts of the modern Court’s
rejection of political process theory. Part II explains how the Court’s doctrine,
particularly on unintentional discrimination, has adopted the view that conservative religious groups are a disfavored minority who face prejudice and
lack social power and that courts should accordingly more carefully scrutinize
laws affecting those groups. Part III then analyzes what the Court’s approach
to new antidiscrimination claims gets right, but also why it is ultimately unjustified.
One caveat before proceeding: The Court has not used the same, more
plaintiff-friendly standard for all religious discrimination claims. As other
commentators have noted, the Court used the very demanding standard that
is more akin to the standard applicable to racial discrimination in the challenge to President Trump’s order excluding nationals from several Muslimmajority countries. 40 The Court required the plaintiffs to show that the order
intentionally sought to disparage or disadvantage Muslims, not merely that it
had the effect of doing so. 41 That disparity, however, reinforces the descriptive
claims in this Article, including those about the jurisprudential worldview that
may be motivating the Court—namely, an apparent belief that white, Christian conservatives are now particularly at risk of discrimination in the United
States. If that is a premise of the Court’s new antidiscrimination doctrine, then
that would explain why the Court does not view laws that burden less familiar,
non-Christian religions with similar skepticism. If the Court believes that conservative Christians face the greatest risk of discrimination in particular social
circles, then laws that burden those religious groups, but not others, would
receive heightened scrutiny. And that fairly describes the set of cases where
the Court has intervened.
I.

PROCESS THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Political process theory represents one effort to minimize a key anxiety in
constitutional law—the countermajoritarian difficulty, which describes the
fact that the federal courts have the power to invalidate acts of the more democratic branches of government. 42 Developed most clearly in John Hart Ely’s

39. See infra text accompanying notes 256–266, 369–375.
40. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); Clarke, supra note 25; see Huq, Discriminatory Intent, supra note 25, at 1217.
41. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2419–21 (“[W]e may consider plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence, but
will uphold the policy so long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification
independent of unconstitutional grounds.”).
42. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962). Federal
judges are not elected, nor are they democratically accountable to the people via elections. Frank
I. Michelman, Brennan and Democracy: The 1996–97 Brennan Center Symposium Lecture, 86
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book, Democracy and Distrust, 43 the theory maintains that the federal courts
should invalidate legislative acts that either interfere with the political process
or are the product of a skewed political process that reflects prejudice against
a discrete and insular minority. 44 This Part explains the contours of political
process theory and the scholarly challenges it has faced.
Of course, there are serious doubts about whether the Court has ever really followed political process theory. 45 At a minimum, well before the 2000s,
the Court stopped relying on a general rule that courts should more carefully
scrutinize laws affecting discrete and insular minorities. By that time, the
Court had refused to apply heightened scrutiny to laws affecting the poor or
the intellectually disabled despite plausible arguments that those groups are
discrete and insular minorities whose interests are not reliably safeguarded by
the political process. 46 Yet while the Court may never have completely embraced political process theory, it is worth understanding the contours of the
theory and the critiques of it—in part because the theory helps to understand
what may be animating the modern Court’s treatment of antidiscrimination
claims.
A. Political Process Theory: Origins
The doctrinal origins of political process theory began as the Lochner era
drew to a close and the New Deal Court began. 47 During the Lochner era, the
Supreme Court invalidated various economic regulations. 48 As the era ended,
the Supreme Court announced that it would adopt a more deferential approach toward legislation rather than second-guessing the political branches’
policies and weaponizing courts’ value judgments against the legislatures’. 49

CALIF. L. REV. 399, 399–400 (1998); see BICKEL, supra, at 16–17 (“[W]hen the Supreme Court
declares unconstitutional a legislative act . . . it thwarts the will of representatives” and “exercises
control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it.”).
43. ELY, supra note 19.
44. Klarman, supra note 19, at 747.
45. See id. at 748 (“[T]he post-Carolene Products Court initially generated results defensible under political process theory, yet subsequently transcended that theory’s limitations without nominating any successor.”); David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 373, 377 (2003).
46. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1973); City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985).
47. See Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided:” Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 686 (2005) (describing the understanding that “the New Deal revolution produced a new breed of Justices who believed in judicial restraint and appropriate
respect for democratic processes in ordinary social and economic regulation”).
48. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125
HARV. L. REV. 379, 380, 447 (2011).
49. E.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397–98 (1937) (invoking “the presumption of the constitutionality of a statute”); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME
COURT REBORN 177–78 (1995).
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Yet the Court needed an account for when it would review legislation
more closely, which Carolene Products’ footnote four provided. Justice Stone’s
opinion for the Court first announced that courts should afford a presumption of constitutionality to “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions.” 50 But then the opinion suggested that “[t]here may be
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality.” 51 Specifically, “more searching judicial inquiry” would be appropriate for “legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation” and for “statutes directed at
particular . . . minorities” where “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities.” 52
Several decades later, John Hart Ely expanded this footnote into a more
fully theorized account of judicial review. 53 In chapter five of Democracy and
Distrust, Ely explained why courts should more closely scrutinize laws that
restrict the political process. 54 There, Ely pointed to Warren Court decisions
that protected the right to vote and argued that the right to vote was a precondition for democracy to function. 55 In chapter six, Ely expanded on why courts
should more closely review laws that are “ ‘directed at’ religious, national, and
racial minorities and [laws] infected by prejudice against them.” 56 Ely argued
that sometimes “[n]o matter how open the [political] process, those with most
of the votes” still unduly “vote themselves advantages at the expense of the
others.” 57 As an example of this phenomenon, Ely pointed to “how our society
has treated its black minority (even after that minority had gained every official attribute of access to the process).” 58 Brown v. Board of Education provides
an example of this category of laws warranting heightened scrutiny—where a
law targets a disfavored minority and would be suspect even if the political
process was open to that minority group. 59 The Court has occasionally described this category as encompassing cases where a group has “experienced a

50. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938). Aaron Tang
found that after 1937, there was a “five-fold increase” in the number of times the Supreme Court
relied on the presumption of constitutionality. Aaron Tang, Rethinking Political Power in Judicial Review, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1755, 1770 n.93 (2018).
51. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
52. Id.
53. See ELY, supra note 19.
54. Id. at 105–25.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 76, 135–79.
57. Id. at 135.
58. Id.
59. 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954); Tang, supra note 22, at 1438–39 (“The prejudice prong . . . is
built precisely for cases like Brown . . . .”).
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‘history of purposeful unequal treatment,’ ” or has “been subjected to unique
disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of
[its] abilities.”60
Ely maintained that these two kinds of interventions ensured that the
democratic processes were actually democratic and worthy of the deference
that federal courts would ordinarily afford them. Where “the [political] process is undeserving of trust,” however, courts need not defer to that process,
Ely argued; instead, courts would intervene in order to make the political process fair and to correct for prejudices that may affect it. 61 Ely defended political
process theory on the ground that it avoided the pitfalls of the Lochner-era
style review because political process theory did not require judges to make
value judgments. 62
B. Challenges
1.

Political Process Theory Challenges

Political process theory was extremely influential,63 although it also had
its critics. 64 Many critics focused on the second element of judicial review described in chapter six of Ely’s Democracy and Distrust—the idea that courts
should more carefully review legislation directed at minorities (particularly
racial minorities) even where the political process was open and accessible to
them. 65 Sometimes, this piece of political process theory is called the prejudice
prong; the access prong, by contrast, refers to instances where the political
process is not open or accessible to a particular group. 66
Paul Brest, among others, argued that, despite Ely’s claims to neutrality,
this species of judicial review “demand[ed] value judgments” by courts. 67 In
particular, it required courts to assess how often groups should prevail in the

60. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
61. ELY, supra note 19, at 87, 103 (advocating for a “participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review”).
62. Id. at 102–03.
63. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 n.4
(1982) (declaring that the “influence of Footnote 4 cannot be measured accurately by simple
enumeration of cases in which it has been cited” as the footnote has had a “ ‘pervasive influence’ ”
on equal protection doctrine in particular).
64. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 197–99 (1990); Bruce A. Ackerman,
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985); Paul Brest, The Substance of Process,
42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131, 142 (1981); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
65. Klarman, supra note 19, at 773; Tang, supra note 22, at 1438.
66. Tang, supra note 22, at 1437–38.
67. Brest, supra note 64, at 131.
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political process and when the outputs of the political process were (too) unfair to a particular group because they were the product of unfair prejudice
against the group. 68 Some of the critiques of the prejudice prong questioned
whether the prejudice prong was even coherent. 69 Bruce Ackerman argued
that discrete and insular minorities actually possess some advantages in the
political process given their smaller numbers (that lead to lower organization
costs and fewer collective action problems). 70 Kenji Yoshino explained that,
to some, the very idea of judicial solicitude for minority groups is inconsistent
with a pluralist society that has considerable demographic diversity. 71
In part for that reason, courts would have to select which groups would
be entitled to heightened protection, which required an account of which
groups are powerless or face prejudice and accordingly warrant heightened
judicial review. Yet making that determination could involve the kind of value
judgments that political process theory sought to avoid. Nicholas Stephanopoulos described how courts and scholars have applied several different and
inconsistent definitions of political powerlessness to discern which groups
might warrant additional judicial scrutiny. 72 Stephanopoulos proposed a
standard that courts should use to measure powerlessness—“how responsive
policy outcomes are to different groups’ preferences, controlling for the
groups’ size and type.” 73 Bertrall Ross and Su Li, by contrast, argued that
measures of political power should not only reflect whether laws advance a
group’s interests but should be more holistic and consider a group’s lobbying
activity, political responsiveness, voter turnout, and descriptive representation in politics. 74
In part because of these critiques and the myriad accounts of powerlessness, Michael Klarman proposed jettisoning the prejudice prong of political
process theory altogether. 75 By contrast, Stephanopoulos, Ross, and Li proposed different ways to measure groups’ political powerlessness to guide
courts’ application of the prejudice prong. 76 Aaron Tang offered a modified
68. Brest argued further that many of the cases that Ely described in terms of the outputs
of the democratic process could be redescribed in terms of the democratic process itself. For
example, Brest argued that abortion restrictions were (as Justice Ginsburg would later argue as
well) restrictions based on gender (either beliefs about gender or restrictions that targeted or
affected one gender). Brest, supra note 64, at 139.
69. Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2 (2015) (arguing against one
element of the test).
70. Ackerman, supra note 64, at 724–31, 737.
71. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 751, 758 (2011).
72. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527, 1536–
45 (2015).
73. Id. at 1594.
74. Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations
and the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323 (2016).
75. Klarman, supra note 19, at 748, 819.
76. Stephanopoulos, supra note 72, at 1594, 1598–99; Ross & Li, supra note 74.
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version of political process theory, under which courts would review more
deferentially legislation that burdens a politically powerful group, at least
where the relevant constitutional provision is indeterminate, even if they did
not more rigorously review legislation that burdens a powerless group. 77 And,
more recently, Samuel Moyn and Ryan Doerfler have argued that Ely’s entire
theory of judicial review should be abandoned. 78
2.

Definition of Discrimination Challenge

Identifying a stable, coherent definition of powerlessness is one challenge
with implementing political process theory. Another is developing an account
of what it means for a law to be targeted at or discriminate against a group.
Political process theory calls for heightened judicial scrutiny of laws that discriminate against discrete and insular minorities and laws that obstruct particular groups’ access to the political process. For both strands of political
process theory, there needs to be a working account of when a law is targeted
at or discriminates against a particular group. 79
One theory that emerged, and that the Supreme Court would later adopt,
is that a law is targeted at and discriminates against a group if the law either
explicitly mentions a particular group or if the law intentionally results in a
disadvantage on that group. 80 In Washington v. Davis, the Court held that
Washington, D.C. did not violate the Equal Protection Clause when it used a
test for hiring and promoting police officers even though a greater proportion
of Black applicants failed the exam. 81 D.C.’s use of the exam would violate
equal protection principles, the Court explained, only if D.C. intentionally
used the test to disadvantage Black applicants. 82
The rule requiring intentional, purposeful discrimination has been criticized on several grounds. First is that it allows governments to reproduce inequalities and hierarchies, even knowingly. 83 Paul Brest accordingly proposed
modifying the equal protection standard to prohibit instances where lawmak-

77. Tang, supra note 50.
78. Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, The Ghost of John Hart Ely, 75 VAND. L. REV. 769
(2022).
79. See Leah M. Litman, The Ethics of Structure (2022) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
80. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979).
81. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Because the case involved D.C., the claim was about the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding
that the federal government is bound by an equal protection guarantee in the Fifth Amendment).
82. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238–48.
83. Litman, supra note 79, at 1–2.
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ers failed to take into account the interests of particular groups or where lawmakers did not show equal concern for a particular group. 84 Second, academics have criticized judicial doctrines that make it especially difficult to establish
that government decisionmakers engaged in intentional discrimination. 85 Jessica Clarke, for example, raised concerns about the “stray remarks” doctrine,
which allows courts to discount racist or sexist remarks. 86 Courts have also
taken a divide-and-conquer approach to assess evidence of intentional discrimination. For example, in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of
the University of California, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs challenging President Trump’s rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals program had not even plausibly alleged that racial discrimination was
a motivating factor for the rescission. 87 In its analysis, the Court separated out
the three kinds of evidence the plaintiffs pointed to (the disparate impact of
the law, statements made by policymakers, and procedural irregularities in the
policy’s enactment) and explained why each piece of evidence, individually,
did not establish that the rescission was motivated by discrimination. 88
The second theory about what constitutes discrimination is sometimes
known as the anticlassification theory. 89 Under an anticlassification theory, all
laws that make an explicit reference to race—laws that are race conscious—
amount to discrimination on the basis of race, no matter their motives. 90 This
theory has featured in the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence. There, the
Court has equated efforts to integrate schools (that rely on race) with efforts
to segregate schools (that rely on race) and subjected both to the same standard of review. 91
So political process theory requires courts to make determinations about
when a law discriminates against a particular group (either by obstructing
their access to the political process or otherwise disadvantaging them). The
Court has arrived at the conclusion that a law discriminates against an individual or group if the law either intentionally imposes disadvantages on an
individual or group or the law explicitly mentions the disadvantaged group or
group characteristic on the face of the law.
84. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term—Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976); see also David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and
the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989).
85. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 79.
86. Clarke, supra note 25, at 540–47.
87. 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
88. Id. at 1915–16.
89. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1286–87 (2011) (describing theory).
90. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004).
91. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis
of race.”).
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TWO TRACKS OF DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

This Part explains how the Court has adopted different accounts of what
constitutes discrimination (Section II.A) and different methods for determining whether discrimination exists (Section II.B) in equal protection cases involving race and First Amendment cases on religious liberty.
This Part compares and contrasts these two sets of claims for several reasons. One is that the Court’s new method of analysis for First Amendment
claims sounds in the register of equality and antidiscrimination: In order to
assess whether a religious group has a First Amendment claim, the Court examines the treatment of comparable secular groups. 92 That is one method the
Court uses to analyze antidiscrimination claims as well—identifying a comparable man if a woman alleges she was discriminated against on the basis of
sex or identifying a comparable white individual if a member of a racial minority alleges they were discriminated against. 93 Moreover, as the summaries
of the prejudice strand of political process theory make clear, 94 social and political history suggests there are reasons for courts to be skeptical of laws that
discriminate on the basis of race and laws that disfavor certain religious
groups. Both racial minorities and religious minorities possess attributes that
scholars and courts have described as warranting heightened judicial solicitude. 95 Additionally, certain strands of antidiscrimination law regarding race
(in particular, the Voting Rights Act provision at issue in the Court’s decision
in Brnovich) contain a disparate impact liability standard. 96 Because the disparate impact liability standard most closely resembles the new standard in
religious discrimination cases, 97 it is useful to compare the two since the Court
has already aligned them in important respects. Finally, as the Introduction
and this Part suggest, as a conceptual matter, the two sets of claims (religious
discrimination and racial discrimination) could be treated similarly. So it’s
worth unpacking where and how the Court has diverged in its treatment of
the two sets of claims. That’s not to say that constitutional text, history, or
structure require the two sets of claims to be treated the exact same way, but
their conceptual overlap makes it useful to identify where they differ and to
assess why that is.

92. Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam).
93. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 734, 751–
64 (2011) (identifying and critiquing this requirement); Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1366–73 (2012).
94. See supra notes 52–78 and accompanying text.
95. These attributes include the existence of a history of discrimination and discreteness
and insularity. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L. REV. 303, 377 tbl.1
(2014) (listing criteria commonly associated with antidiscrimination protection).
96. See infra text accompanying notes 163–195.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 111–115.
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A. Defining Discrimination
The Court has adopted different accounts of what constitutes discrimination in cases involving allegations of religious discrimination than in cases involving allegations of racial discrimination. This Section focuses on how the
cases seemingly diverge on a basic question—what constitutes discrimination.
The full range of definitions or theories of discrimination is beyond the scope
of this Article. But it is helpful to reiterate a few accounts of discrimination
that have permeated the case law and scholarship, two of which have been
presented as alternatives to one another—the first is intentional discrimination, and the second is laws or policies that produce discriminatory effects.
Intentional discrimination refers to laws or policies that create a disadvantage
on a particular group where lawmakers or policymakers intentionally created
that disadvantage. 98 Laws or policies with discriminatory effects are those that
result in a greater disadvantage on one group relative to others, no matter the
reason why a law or policy was enacted. 99 Sometimes this account of discrimination is referred to as disparate impact liability—where a law may violate the
Constitution or a statute if it unintentionally produces a greater disadvantage
on one group relative to another. These two kinds of discrimination are sometimes presented as alternatives to one another—or at least as alternative theories of what the Equal Protection Clause might prohibit. 100 In addition to these
two accounts of discrimination, there is a third approach worth canvassing—
the anticlassification approach. The anticlassification theory maintains that
courts should be particularly skeptical of laws or policies that, in their text,
single out a particular group for disadvantageous treatment. 101 The anticlassification theory is not necessarily an addition or alternative to the preceding
theories; anticlassification theory could be a mechanism to identify intentional discrimination. 102
1.

New Religion Cases

With that background in mind, it is easier to see the divergence between
the Court’s racial discrimination and religious discrimination cases. In the religion context, the Court has adopted a theory of discrimination that discounts
the relevance of intent and focuses more on the relative burdens of a law, comparing the burdens faced by religious organizations to the burdens faced by
98. E.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519,
524 (2015). Case law and scholarship differ on what precise mental state or kind of intent the
law or policymakers must have. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative
Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 537–54 (2016).
99. Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 1570.
100. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 493, 494–95 (2003).
101. See Siegel, supra note 89, at 1287–89 (explaining theory).
102. See Litman, supra note 79.
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(at least some) nonreligious organizations. 103 That focus bears important similarities to the idea that discrimination encompasses laws or policies with discriminatory effects—those laws or policies that impose greater disadvantages
or advantages on one group relative to others. The Court has also adopted a
second account of what constitutes discrimination—the existence of discretionary exemptions in a law or regulation that create the possibility of discriminatory effects or the potential for intentional discrimination. Both theories
result in more searching judicial scrutiny of laws where the challenge is based
on religious discrimination.
This Section explains how the religion cases adopting a new approach to
unintentional discrimination, as well as the theories they channel, invite an
analysis of the effects of a law.
a.

Discriminatory Effects in the Cases: (Lack of) Burdens on Comparable
Secular Activity

Several cases, together with the writings of individual justices, highlight
how the Court has, in cases of religious discrimination claims, subjected laws
to heightened scrutiny because of the law’s effects and specifically because a
law results in a secular activity being treated better than religious activity. 104
The Court’s opinion in Tandon v. Newsom105 crystallized this trend, which
had emerged from a series of unexplained or fractured orders on the Court’s
shadow docket. 106 Tandon appeared to embrace what some scholars called the
“most-favored nation” theory of discrimination for free exercise claims; under
that theory, a law or policy “discriminates” against religion if it treats a comparable nonreligious entity better than religious entities. 107
To understand the theory, start by considering Title VII, 108 the statute that
prohibits various forms of discrimination by employers who have fifteen or

103. Tebbe, supra note 14, at 2399 (“[The Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause] does not require any showing of discriminatory purpose, object or intent.”); id. at 2399–
400 (“[T]he new equality . . . does not require a facial classification.”).
104. I discuss potential differences infra in the text accompanying notes 126–128. Although Nelson Tebbe believes the theories are distinct from one another, he agrees disparate impact is the closest comparator to the theory the Court has adopted. See Tebbe, supra note 14, at
2429–30.
105. 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021) (per curiam).
106. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam); S. Bay
United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021) (mem.); High Plains Harvest
Church v. Polis, 141 S. Ct. 527 (2020) (mem.); Gateway City Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1460
(2021) (mem.); Gish v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1290 (2021) (mem.); Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v.
Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 889 (2020) (mem.); see Vladeck, supra note 26.
107. Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 49–50.
108. See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 1465, 1539–42 (1999) (arguing against the most favored nation approach).
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more employees. 109 Given that Title VII prohibits a religious employer with
fifteen employees from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, but
does not prohibit a nonreligious employer with fourteen employees from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, a theory that asks whether a law
treats a comparable nonreligious activity better than religious activity might
suggest that Title VII “discriminates” against the religious employer. The law
treats a somewhat comparable nonreligious entity (a secular employer with
fourteen employees) more favorably than a religious entity (a religious employer with fifteen employees). But all laws will contain some provision defining their scope (like Title VII’s fifteen-employee limitation), and if those
provisions are thought to exempt some comparable secular entities from regulation, then the law might trigger searching judicial review in cases involving
religious discrimination. Indeed, relying on this reasoning, one district court
invalidated Title VII on religious liberty grounds. 110
Or consider a hypothetical measure to reduce transmission of the coronavirus that restricts all indoor gatherings to 10 percent capacity, but permits
organizations that provide food, healthcare services, or basic household repair
items to remain open at 50 percent capacity. Under the most favored nation
theory, this measure could “discriminate” against religious entities because it
restricts religious entities’ capacity to 10 percent while permitting hardware
stores and doctor’s offices to remain open at 50 percent.
This kind of reasoning was on display in Tandon v. Newsom, a challenge
to a California policy that limited in-home gatherings to three households. 111
The policy prohibited in-home gatherings of both a religious and secular nature; it was facially neutral in that it did not single out secular activity for more
favorable treatment or religious activity for less favorable treatment. 112 But
California permitted “hair salons, retail stores,” and other service businesses
“to bring together more than three households at a time.” 113 For that reason,
because the policy treated some, but not all, “comparable secular activities
more favorably than at-home religious exercise,” the policy was presumptively
unconstitutional. 114
This reasoning shares several things in common with a discriminatory effects theory of discrimination. First, the trigger for heightened scrutiny, and
the reason to presume that a policy is unconstitutional, is not a conclusion
about the purpose or intent behind the policy. The intent or purpose of the
policy does not factor prominently into an analysis of whether the policy
amounts to discrimination. And the analysis does not require a showing that
policymakers intentionally sought to prefer secular activities over religious

109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
110. Bear Creek Bible Church v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 571 F. Supp. 3d 571
(N.D. Tex. 2021).
111. 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1298 (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
112. Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1298 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 1297 (majority opinion).
114. Id.
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ones. Second, the policy is facially neutral: it does not single out religious activities for disadvantageous treatment, nor does it single out secular activities
for advantageous treatment. Third, the Court’s focus is on the effects or results
of the policy—which entities are allowed to gather with more than three
homes and which entities are not.
The separate writings in other opinions underscore the extent to which
the Court focuses on comparing the burdens imposed on different entities.
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v.
Cuomo noted that “hardware stores, acupuncturists, and liquor stores” as well
as “[b]icycle repair shops, certain signage companies, accountants, lawyers,
and insurance agents” were not subject to the same restrictions as religious
gatherings. 115 He specifically drew attention to the “burden on the faithful.”116
Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence similarly highlighted the disparate effects of
the state’s rules: “a church or synagogue must adhere to a 10-person attendance cap, while a grocery store . . . down the street does not face the same restriction.” 117
Decisions leading up to Tandon reveal the same tendencies. 118 Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo enjoined a gubernatorial executive order on religious liberty grounds. The order imposed restrictions in particular
areas based on COVID-19 rates; in red zones, all public lectures, concerts, and
performances were prohibited, but religious gatherings could include 10 people or 25 percent capacity (whichever was lower). 119 The Court described the
fault with these restrictions as follows: While a synagogue or church was limited to 10 persons, “acupuncture facilities, camp grounds, garages” and “plants
manufacturing chemicals . . . and . . . transportation facilities” were not so
limited. 120 The state orders, the Court explained, “lead to troubling results,”
since a large store could have many shoppers, but a church or synagogue could
not have many worshippers. 121

115. 141 S. Ct. 63, 69 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
116. Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 72 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). In another case, Justice Gorsuch dissented from the denial of emergency relief again to make explicit the concern
with discriminatory effects, writing that “even neutral and generally applicable laws are subject
to strict scrutiny where” they burden particular rights. Danville Christian Acad., Inc. v. Beshear,
141 S. Ct. 527, 529 (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
117. Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 73 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
118. South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom enjoined California from enforcing
the prohibition on in-person gatherings in certain areas with high coronavirus rates but left in
place the percentage capacity limits and the prohibition on singing and chanting during indoor
services. 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021) (mem.).
119. Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct. 63.
120. Id. at 66.
121. Id. at 66–67.
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Decisions after Tandon reveal similar pathologies. 122 Dissenting from the
Court’s refusal to issue an emergency injunction in a case challenging Maine’s
vaccine requirement for public employees, Justice Gorsuch, together with Justices Thomas and Alito, wrote that the vaccine mandate was not neutral because it failed to treat “comparable secular activity” the same as religious
exercise. 123 They noted that the “State allows those invoking medical reasons
to avoid the vaccine mandate” but not “those invoking religious reasons to do
the very same thing.” 124 While Justice Barrett and Justice Kavanaugh concurred in the order declining to issue an emergency injunction, their writing
explaining their votes did not engage with or disagree with Justice Gorsuch’s
analysis on the merits. They merely stated that the issues in the case, which
was the Court’s first religious liberty challenge to vaccine mandates, were
more appropriately addressed on the regular merits docket rather than the
shadow docket, because otherwise parties could “force the Court to give a
merits pre-view” of how it would resolve a constitutional question. 125
b.

Discriminatory Effects in the Theories: Most Favored Nation, Single
Secular Exemptions, and Equal Value

While the theory of discrimination that the Court has adopted shares important similarities with a disparate impact or discriminatory effects theory of
discrimination, it is more commonly referred to as the “most favored nation”
theory, or what Nelson Tebbe has recently dubbed the theory of “equal value.”
This Section explains scholars’ efforts to describe the doctrine or theory in the
Court’s COVID-19 cases and shows how these accounts will still turn on an
analysis of the effects of a law.
The trigger for heightened review and indicia of discrimination in these
cases is whether a state law or policy treats any comparable secular activity
more favorably than religious activity. As Nelson Tebbe has explained, this
theory differs in some respects from a disparate impact theory of liability. 126
A theory of most favored nation status or equal value could be both more protective and less protective than disparate impact liability. It could be more
protective because even if a law or policy does not result in greater burdens on

122. In a curious footnote in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, the Court stated that a
plaintiff may “prove a free exercise violation by showing that ‘official expressions of hostility’ to
religion accompany laws or policies burdening religious exercise.” 142 S. Ct. 2407, 2422 n.1
(2022) (quoting Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732
(2018)). The Court has never applied that as the standard in race discrimination cases and allowed plaintiffs to show unconstitutional racial discrimination through a combination of burdens on a racial group and “official expressions of hostility.” Id.
123. Does 1–3 v. Mills, 142 S. Ct. 17, 20 (2021) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting
Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 18 (Barrett, J., concurring).
126. See Tebbe, supra note 14, at 2430–31.

October 2022]

Disparate Discrimination

25

religious groups relative to nonreligious groups, there may still be liability. 127
And it could be less protective insofar as there would be no liability if a law or
policy did not treat a comparable secular activity better than a religious activity but nonetheless resulted in comparatively greater burdens on religious activities than nonreligious ones. 128
But as explained above, the theory the Court adopted still has a lot in common with a disparate impact theory of discrimination. Indeed, the Court’s
theory could be recast as a species of disparate impact liability rather than as
an entirely separate theory. The question that the Supreme Court has focused
on in the religious discrimination cases is whether religious activity has been
treated relatively worse than any secular activity. That focus is on the effects
of a rule, similar to the focus in a disparate impact liability regime. But the
comparators are different from those in a traditional disparate impact analysis. No longer is the focus on groups in the aggregate and whether all religious
activity is treated worse than all secular activity. Instead, the focus is on
whether any religious activity is treated worse than any secular activity. That
could be understood as a twist on a disparate impact regime, since the question is not how entire groups are treated relative to one another but how the
members of one group are treated relative to individual members of another
group.
For comparison, imagine if disparate impact liability proceeded as follows: A racial minority could make out a disparate impact claim any time a
law or policy unintentionally resulted in more favorable treatment of any
(comparable) white individual. Or a person who identifies as female could
make out a disparate impact claim any time a law or policy unintentionally
resulted in more favorable treatment of any (comparable) individual who
identified as male. That is how the Court has articulated the equal value/most
favored nation theory: The question is whether a law or policy resulted in
more favorable treatment of any (comparable) nonreligious activity.
Some academics have cast the most favored nation or equal value theory
in terms of a “single secular exception” theory that could be a species of anticlassification theory.129 These scholars depict the relevant question as whether
a law contains an exemption from a generally applicable rule for any (comparable) secular activity. But that is not exactly how the Court has framed the
legal test in the COVID-19 cases; liability does not exist only where there is an
exemption from a generally applicable rule in the text of a statute or regulation. The question is instead whether the law or policy treats “comparable secular activity more favorable than religious exercise,” either through an explicit

127. See id. (“[E]qual value bars against effects that are not disproportionate.”).
128. See id. at 2430 (“[D]isparate impact works regardless of exemptions.”).
129. Douglas Laycock & Steven T. Collis, Generally Applicable Law and the Free Exercise
of Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1, 21–23 (2016); Laycock, supra note 107, at 49–50.
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exemption, particularized list, or some generally applicable criterion that resulted in comparable secular activity being treated more favorably than religious activity. 130
Some commentators have also attempted to fit the Court’s recent
COVID-19 cases into the overarching disparate impact standard that applies
in both religious discrimination and racial discrimination cases. Under that
theory, laws that are generally applicable and apply to both religious and nonreligious activity (or apply to persons of different races) are presumptively
constitutional. These commentators have argued that the COVID-19 policies
were not generally applicable, and were therefore presumptively unconstitutional, because they did not treat similarly situated religious and nonreligious
entities alike. 131
But that would only be true if the definition of what activity is “similarly
situated” is so expansive that it is virtually meaningless and does not produce
much of a legal test at all. In the Court’s COVID-19 cases, after all, the justices
have said that indoor, in-home religious gatherings are equivalent to outdoor
“camp grounds” when the risks of virus transmission differ for indoor and
outdoor activities. The justices have also said that the risks of transmission are
the same for in-home religious gatherings and “transportation facilities” and
“hardware stores” where people do not gather for long periods of time while
singing or chanting. If those activities are “similarly situated” with respect to
the state’s interest in reducing the transmission of COVID-19 such that a law
cannot differentiate between the activities, then a good deal of secular activity
could be similarly situated to religious activity. 132 Or take Justice Gorsuch’s
writing in Does 1–3 v. Mills, where he equated exemptions for persons who
cannot be safely vaccinated with exemptions for persons with religious objections to vaccines: The reasons to say that someone does not have to be vaccinated if vaccination would pose a risk to their health and life are not the
same as saying that someone does not have to be vaccinated if they do not
support vaccines. 133 But if all of these things are equivalent to one another,
that would mean a law could not result in (almost) any secular activity being
treated more favorably than religious activity. Practically speaking, that would
generate something like a discriminatory effects analysis that would ask
whether a law or policy results in any secular activity being treated more favorably than religious activity. And that would make the standard functionally

130. Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam).
131. See, e.g., Mark Storslee (@mark_storslee), TWITTER (Apr. 10, 2021, 12:03 PM), https://
twitter.com/mark_storslee/status/1380914352379863041?s=20 [perma.cc/6QD7-8Q5U].
132. See infra text accompanying notes 143–159 (discussing how the Court is alternately
defining and considering the purpose behind regulation and exemption).
133. Does 1–3 v. Mills, 142 S. Ct. 17, 18 (2021) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). There are
also good reasons to distinguish between them for other reasons—it is easier to supervise medical exemptions, and the state may not want to get into the business of distinguishing between
different religious objections.
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equivalent to the discriminatory effects standard outlined above—namely,
whether a law or policy results in some secular activity being treated better
than religious activity.
Another way of capturing the change in the Court’s doctrine is to compare the Court’s previous, pre-COVID cases, which did not seek to assess
whether laws or policies treated similarly situated religious and nonreligious
entities alike or whether laws exempted nonreligious activity from regulation,
unless that comparison revealed that the intent behind a law was to disfavor
religion. For example, in Employment Division v. Smith, the Court upheld a
criminal prohibition on peyote ingestion against a challenge that the law prohibited religious exercise that included peyote use. 134 But the prohibition exempted some nonreligious uses of peyote—the law allowed people to use
peyote where “the substance has been prescribed by a medical practitioner”
but did not similarly exempt religious uses of the drug. 135 To the extent the
Court’s prior cases considered whether a law did or did not regulate similarly
situated secular activity, they did so only to ascertain whether the law was motivated by an intent to disadvantage a religious exercise; if plaintiffs could
show that the law intentionally discriminated against religion, then they
would succeed. 136
Even a narrower version of Tebbe’s equal value theory would seem to involve some analysis of the effects of a law, which activities are treated more
favorably than others, and the nature of those activities. Under Tebbe’s articulation of the theory, the question is whether “a government regulates protected activities while exempting other activities” such that the government
has “devalued protected practices . . . as less worthwhile than the exempted
activities.” 137 How might that analysis work? Say that a city closes all buildings
where groups gather in order to fit the buildings with improved ventilation
systems and prevent the spread of COVID-19, but during the time window
for the installation, a religious group had planned to gather at a church, and
so the city’s installation plan shuts down the religious gathering to allow for
construction. Or say a city closes its parks in order to spray for bugs at a time
when a religious group had planned to gather at one of the parks. The effects
of those policies are that the government has treated the “exempted activities”
of installing ventilation systems and implementing pesticide treatments as

134. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
135. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874, 890.
136. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993)
(“The ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion. The pattern we have recited
discloses animosity to Santeria adherents and their religious practices; the ordinances by their
own terms target this religious exercise; the texts of the ordinances were gerrymandered with
care to proscribe religious killings of animals but to exclude almost all secular killings; and the
ordinances suppress much more religious conduct than is necessary in order to achieve the legitimate ends asserted in their defense.”).
137. Tebbe, supra note 14, at 2398.
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more worthwhile than protected religious exercise. Has the government “devalued” the protected practice of religious exercise by allowing some nonreligious activity but not religious activity to occur? Answering that question
seems to invite courts to assess the relative importance of the two activities.
Tebbe’s version of equal value theory would answer the question by analyzing whether the government’s regulatory “interest applies evenly to the regulated and unregulated categories.” 138 For the former policies, which contain
no apparent exemptions, perhaps the answer would be no, and the policies
would be constitutional since installing new ventilation systems helps to prevent the spread of COVID-19 but religious gatherings do not (and because
spraying for bugs wards away bugs but religious gatherings do not). But that
inquiry seems to turn on whether the government has shut down buildings
and parks for some valid secular purpose, such as preventing the spread of
COVID-19 or an infestation of pests. And that inquiry is not meaningfully
different from ordinary accounts of intentional discrimination, which focus
on the reasons for the government’s actions, not their effects. If equal value
differs from that theory (which represented the prior doctrine), as scholars
have said that it does, it would seem to call for something else, such as an analysis of the effects of a law or policy and the nature of the activities that it burdens.
And the Court’s COVID-19 cases are quite different from earlier theories
of the Free Exercise Clause. The cases seem to include some assessment about
whether the exempted or nonregulated activities are, in some general sense, as
important as religious activity, and not just whether the government’s regulatory interest applies to both unregulated and regulated entities. Recall that the
Court equated outdoor campgrounds with indoor in-home religious gatherings; these things are not similarly situated with respect to the government’s
interest in preventing the spread of the coronavirus, but the Court could easily
have thought camping less important than religious exercise. The same goes
for the Court’s equation of hardware stores and acupuncture services with indoor in-home religious gatherings. These activities are not particularly similarly situated with respect to the government’s interest in containing the
spread of COVID-19, but the Court could have thought acupuncture less important than religious exercise.
Several passages in the Court’s opinions suggest that is how the Court approached the analysis—asking whether the regulated activities were as important as constitutionally protected religious exercise. For example, Tandon
explained that the fact that California permitted “hair salons, retail stores, personal care services, movie theaters, private suites at sporting events and concerts, and indoor restaurants to bring together more than three households at
a time” made out a claim of religious discrimination. 139 But that list would
establish the existence of discrimination if what mattered was the general na-

138.
139.

Id.
Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1297 (2021) (per curiam).
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ture of the activities and how important they were, not their risk of transmission of the virus, which would turn on, among other things, the kinds of buildings where they were conducted, how many people were there at any time,
what the people there did and how they interacted with others, and so on.
To be sure, Tandon asserted that courts should consider whether the religious activities were comparably situated to the unregulated nonreligious activities in terms of the government’s interest. 140 But what the Court did,
equating private suites or personal care services with in-home religious gatherings, and how it reasoned elsewhere (merely listing activities that were unregulated as if naming the unregulated activities sufficed to establish
unconstitutional discrimination), suggests that part of what is driving the
analysis is a loose assessment of the general importance of the unregulated
activities on the one hand and the regulated, religious activities on the other.
Roman Catholic Diocese reasoned similarly—asserting that the mere fact that
businesses allowed to continue operating included “acupuncture facilities,
camp grounds, [and] garages” sufficed to establish religious discrimination. 141
Particularly without any analysis of how and where those businesses were conducted, that reasoning conveys only that the Court made some general assessment of the relative importance of the various activities. Indeed, Roman
Catholic Diocese noted that “the list of ‘essential’ businesses includes . . . many
whose services are not limited to those that can be regarded as essential, such
as all plants manufacturing chemicals and microelectronics and all transportation facilities.” 142
Here the analysis seems to turn on the effects of the law—whether the law
sweeps in certain kinds of activities (religious exercise) but not others (less
important secular activities). That does not necessarily involve a focus on the
government’s interest or the reasons for a law. It does, however, focus on the
results of a law or policy. For example, relying on Tandon, a federal district
court found that a vaccine requirement was not neutral and generally applicable because it contained a medical exception—an exemption where vaccines
were medically contraindicated. 143 The court emphasized that what matters is
not the purpose behind the policy or even the purpose behind the exemption. 144
Another way of getting at whether the new religious discrimination theory is about effects and the relative importance of different activities is to ask
what purpose or regulatory interest the Court might be using in order to assess
whether the regulated and nonregulated activities are similarly situated to one

140. Id. at 1296.
141. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66 (2020) (per curiam).
142. Id.; see also id. at 69 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). The order determined which businesses
were allowed to remain open in terms of whether they were deemed essential. Id. at 66 (majority
opinion).
143. Dr. A. v. Hochul, 567 F. Supp. 3d 362, 374–75 (N.D.N.Y. 2021), rev’d sub nom. We
the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 266 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
144. Id. at 375.
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another. Is the relevant purpose the one behind the underlying prohibition or
regulation? Or is the relevant purpose the motivation behind the exemption(s)
from the prohibition? In the context of the Court’s COVID-19 cases, the purpose of the prohibition on various indoor gatherings was to contain the transmission of the disease. The various exemptions from that prohibition, by
contrast, may have a slightly different purpose—they may have rested on
something like a balancing analysis that considered the risk of transmission
from the activity against the importance of continuing the activity. It is not
uncommon for policymakers to consider those kinds of pros and cons when
crafting a policy and deciding its scope. The theory of equal value, then, would
seem to allow courts, when focusing on a policymaker’s reason for treating
two activities differently, to conduct the courts’ own assessment of the relative
importance of various activities. That raises serious concerns about institutional competence and institutional propriety if courts are being asked to determine the relative importance of different kinds of religious exercise.
Consider again the city that closes all buildings where groups gather in
order to fit the buildings with improved ventilation systems and prevent the
spread of COVID-19. What if the city exempted hospitals and allowed hospitals to continue operating while improved ventilation systems were installed?
There, a court might consider whether religious activity is comparably situated to hospitals with respect to the government’s interest in the prohibition
or it might consider whether religious activity is similarly situated to hospitals
with respect to the government’s interest in the exemption. The purpose of
the underlying prohibition (no gatherings while ventilation is installed) is to
contain the spread of COVID-19. The purpose of the exemption, however, is
probably something different—an assessment of when the costs of containing
the spread of COVID-19 are too high, perhaps because it would constrain important, life-saving activities. How is a court to assess the importance of religious exercise in that calculus?
This example reveals how easily equal value can slip into a discriminatory
effects regime that allows courts to assess the relative importance of religious
exercise. A city might write the preceding policy in these terms: “There will be
no in-person gatherings in buildings while the buildings are fit with improved
ventilation systems. However, hospitals are exempt from this requirement.”
That version of the policy would clearly implicate the equal value theory—
there are regulated entities and exempted activities. But a city could just as
easily rewrite that policy to accomplish the same results by saying, “There will
be no in-person gatherings in buildings that do not offer life-saving care while
the buildings are fit with improved ventilation systems.” That version of the
policy regulates the same entities and exempts the same activities as the preceding policy with the exemption, which means it could raise the same questions about whether the government has devalued religious exercise. Courts
could ask the same questions about whether the government’s regulatory interest is implicated to the same extent for both regulated and unregulated activities. Given that the equal value theory is not especially concerned with how
the law is written (and specifically whether the law contains a facial religious
classification), it would be strange if the former version, but not the latter,
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triggered heightened judicial scrutiny. And that means the trigger for the theory is, in important respects, the effects of a law, meaning who ends up regulated and who ends up not regulated. Accordingly, the application of the
theory may turn on courts’ assessment of how important the various activities
are.
c.

Discretion and Exemptions

The Court’s recent decision in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia supplied a
second account of what constitutes discrimination—or at least what kind of
legal structures raise the specter of discrimination. 145 Fulton involved a challenge to the City of Philadelphia’s contract terms for agencies to participate in
the foster care system (in several different ways). In Fulton, agencies participated in the foster care process by certifying that foster families satisfy the
statutory criteria for fostering children. 146 But to receive a foster care contract
from the City to perform that function, agencies had to agree not to “reject a
child or family based upon their . . . sexual orientation.” 147 Yet several religious agencies refused to certify same-sex married couples. 148 They sued the
City, arguing that it violated their right to free exercise of religion to require
them, as a condition for participating in the foster certification program, to
certify same-sex married couples in violation of their religious beliefs that
marriage is between a man and a woman. 149
The Court held that the City’s contract terms were subject to strict scrutiny. The contractual obligation not to discriminate was generally applicable
in that it applied to both religious and nonreligious agencies. But the Court
read into the contract a discretionary exemption process that allowed the
Commissioner to grant an exception “in his/her sole discretion.” 150 The City
had argued that an exemption was not available to relieve contractors of their
obligation not to discriminate in the certification process; it was, instead, applicable only to an agency’s ability to refuse referrals to place a child with a
certified foster family. 151 In other words, the City argued that it could relieve
contracting agencies of the obligation to place children with certain foster
families but that it did not have the power to relieve contracting agencies of
their obligation to certify prospective foster care families on a nondiscriminatory basis. The Court nonetheless read the contract term to allow the City to

145. 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
146. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1875; 55 PA. CODE §§ 3700.61, 3700.64, 3700.69 (2022).
147. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1879 (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Id. at 1875.
149. Id. at 1876.
150. Id. at 1878.
151. Id. at 1879 (citing Brief for City Respondents at 36, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19123)). The City argued that an independent term in the contract prohibited discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation and that the contract term did not provide for any exceptions. Id.
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relieve agencies of their obligation to certify prospective foster care parents
without discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. 152
Even after reading the City’s contract to do what the City argued it did
not, there was no indication that the exemption process would lead to intentional discrimination against religious entities or produce disproportionately
negative effects on them. It was undisputed that the City had never granted an
exemption from the nondiscrimination requirement. 153 Nor was there any evidence that the City would offer an exemption to nonreligious entities but not
religious ones. Still, the hypothetical possibility that the City might consider
an agency’s religious beliefs in granting a hypothetical exception—something
that had never before happened—sufficed to trigger strict scrutiny. “The creation of a formal mechanism for granting exceptions,” the Court explained,
“ ‘invite[s]’ the government to decide which reasons for not complying with
the policy are worthy of solicitude,” raising concerns about discrimination
against religious entities. 154
Thus, after Fulton, it is not only a policy’s disparate effects on religious
and secular activities that trigger heightened scrutiny. It is also the existence
of an exemption process, even if that process does not have a disparately negative impact on religious entities, because the hypothetical possibility of granting an exemption invites the government to consider reasons for not
complying with the policy. That prospect, according to the Court, raises an
impermissibly high risk of discrimination against religious entities. 155

152. Id.
153. Id. (“[T]he City and intervenor-respondents contend that the availability of exceptions under section 3.21 is irrelevant because the Commissioner has never granted one.”).
154. Id. (quoting Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)). In Fulton, the
Court maintained that this rule followed from Smith, and specifically from Smith’s discussion of
Sherbert v. Verner. Id. (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 884). Sherbert addressed an unemployment benefits scheme that prohibited benefits for those persons who had “failed, without good cause . . . to
accept available suitable work.” 374 U.S. 398, 401 (1963). But in Sherbert, there was no question
that the prohibition on employment benefits for persons who “failed, without good cause . . . to
accept available suitable work” was relevant to—and indeed an element of—every application
for unemployment benefits. Put another way, in order to obtain employment benefits, the state
had to determine whether a person had “failed, without good cause” to accept other work; that
was a necessary element of an employment benefit determination. There the good cause determination was part and parcel of any employment benefit determination; it did not supply the
possibility of exceptions in some cases on a discretionary basis. In part for that reason, the “exception” in Sherbert had been applied multiple times—any time the state granted employment
benefits, it would have concluded that the person had not failed “without good cause” to accept
suitable work.
155. This idea has some similarities to a principle that governs when restrictions on speech
are constitutional. In Saia v. New York, the Court invalidated a law that prohibited “the use of
sound amplification devices except with permission of the Chief of Police” because “[t]here
[we]re no standards prescribed for the exercise of [the Chief of Police’s] discretion” about
whether to grant a permit. 334 U.S. 558, 558–60 (1948). That principle does not map neatly onto
the exemption in Fulton for a few reasons. One is that the permit process in Saia involved “a
previous restraint on the right of free speech,” id. at 559–60, requiring speakers to obtain official
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After Fulton, several courts of appeals have concluded that policies triggered heightened scrutiny in light of the exemptions contained in the policies. 156 In Dahl v. Board of Trustees of Western Michigan University, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that the university’s vaccination requirement for student athletes was subject to strict scrutiny because the
policy allowed the university to grant individual requests for medical and religious exemptions. 157 Indeed, at least three justices believed that a workplace
vaccine mandate was unconstitutional because “individualized exemptions
[were] available” if employees supplied a “ ‘written statement’ from a doctor
or other care provider indicating that immunization ‘may be’ medically inadvisable.’ ” 158 While Justice Barrett and Justice Kavanaugh concurred in the
Court’s decision to decline to issue an emergency injunction preventing
Maine from encoring the vaccine mandate, they explained that was because
“this case . . . is the first to address the questions presented,” which made the
issue more appropriate for resolution on the “merits” docket, rather than the
shadow “emergency docket.” 159
* * *
Both of these accounts of what constitutes a neutral, generally applicable
law that is presumptively constitutional—laws with no discretionary exemptions and laws that do not result in secular activities being treated more favorably than religious ones—represent important shifts in the Court’s free
exercise jurisprudence. Employment Division v. Smith held that “generally applicable” laws whose effect was to burden religious exercise are generally constitutional. 160 The Court had previously framed the rule in these terms:
Generally applicable laws are constitutional unless “the object or purpose of a
permission before speaking, an arrangement that raises unique First Amendment concerns. Another is that the structure of the discretion differed; in Saia, there was unfettered discretion about
whether to grant a permit to begin with, whereas in Fulton the issue was about the possible discretion to waive a particular contract requirement. If the requirement in Fulton were similar, it
would have involved a system of unfettered discretion about whether to grant an entity a contract to certify foster parents to begin with. Instead, the city contract conditions provided a baseline expectation and requirement of nondiscrimination in Fulton. There were no similar baseline
rules or guidance in Saia. The scope of the discretion differed in another way as well: The permitting process in Saia concerned whether to grant permission to speak—to use a device for
creating and amplifying speech. The universe of discretion in Fulton was not limited to activities
that appeared constitutionally protected.
156. E.g., Foothill Church v. Watanabe, 3 F.4th 1201 (9th Cir. 2021) (mem.) (remanding
for district court to consider whether policy requiring health insurance coverage for abortions
was subject to strict scrutiny because state health director had the power to exempt individual
plans or groups of plans from requirement).
157. 15 F.4th 728 (6th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
158. Does 1–3 v. Mills, 142 S. Ct. 17, 19 (2021) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 802(4-B) (2021)).
159. Id. at 18 (Barrett, J., concurring).
160. 494 U.S. 872, 878, 880 (1990).
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law” was “the suppression of religion or religious conduct.” 161 The Court’s
new cases fit under that framework only if the trigger for identifying the object
or purpose of a law, or lack of general applicability and neutrality is trivial—a
single secular exemption or a law that otherwise results in some remotely
“comparable secular activity [being treated] more favorably than religious exercise.” 162 As explained above, the Court has put aside questions of intent in
these cases and so expansively interpreted what constitutes similarly situated
activity as to usher in a regime where any law or policy that treats some secular
activity more favorably than religious exercise may be viewed with suspicion.
The new cases represent a change in what constitutes disparate treatment and
discrimination in cases involving religion.
2. Race Discrimination Cases
Now compare how the Court has rejected a similar standard with respect
to racial discrimination—first in interpreting a statute that created a disparate
impact liability regime (the Voting Rights Act), and second in constitutional
cases arising in a similar context to the religious discrimination cases (the
coronavirus pandemic) but concerning other rights, the right to vote and the
right to be free from racial discrimination.
Before describing what the cases do, a quick note about what they could
do but do not: It is conceivable that cases on race discrimination could implement a similar standard as the religious discrimination cases for cases involving claims of unintentional discrimination (that is, disparate impact claims).
Proponents of the theory have argued as much. 163 To understand why, it is
important to clarify that, under current law, disparate impact claims, unlike
intentional discrimination claims, have only been used by racial minorities.164
The Supreme Court’s most recent disparate impact case on the Fair Housing
Act described disparate impact doctrine in these terms, as a mechanism to
protect historically disadvantaged groups from “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers” to key institutions and structures within society—employment and housing, among others. 165
The theory that the Court has used in the context of religion could also
work in the context of racial discrimination claims. The question would be

161. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
162. Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam).
163. Cass R. Sunstein, Our Anti-Korematsu, 1 AM. J.L. & EQUAL. 221, 236–37 (2021);
Tebbe, supra note 14, at 2458–60.
164. Primus, supra note 100, at 528–29 (noting that “[every] authority there is supports
the view that employment practices with disparately adverse impacts on historically dominant
classes are, as a matter of law, not actionable under Title VII” but cautioning that “[o]ne should
not lean too heavily on the authority of” the few cases that exist).
165. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 543
(2015) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)); Primus, supra note 100, at
523–31 (identifying this as a possible motive for disparate impact regimes).
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whether, under the government’s facially neutral standard, a policy results in
racial minorities being treated worse than (some) group of white individuals.
As the Introduction explained, that might be the case under absentee voting
rules that allow older voters, including some older white voters, but not
younger racial minorities, to vote absentee. Or it might be the case under
school legacy admissions policies that give preferences to (often white) children of alums of the schools but do not afford a similar preference to racial
minorities. 166 In either case, the government would be required to show that
the “favored” group (older white voters or white legacy admissions) are very
differently situated with respect to whatever the government’s interest is—be
it the prevention of voter fraud or the composition of a talented school class
that preserves the value of the school. But that is not what the Court has done,
either in cases involving a statutory scheme with a disparate impact regime
(the Voting Rights Act) or with constitutional cases involving disparate impact claims. 167
a.

Voting Rights Act

In Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, the Court provided the
first guidance for how courts should assess vote denial claims under Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act. 168 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was amended
after the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden interpreted the
Voting Rights Act to prohibit only intentional racial discrimination in voting
and not those voting policies that unintentionally result in racial disparities.169
The law now provides that
[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color. 170

By statutory amendment, Congress established that the prohibition was violated

166. See Kathryn Ladewski, Note, Preserving a Racial Hierarchy: A Legal Analysis of the
Disparate Racial Impact of Legacy Preferences in University Admissions, 108 MICH. L. REV. 577
(2010).
167. This Section considers a Voting Rights Act case in addition to equal protection cases
because the nature of the Voting Rights Act claim sounded in discrimination (rather than denial
of the right to vote, standing alone), and because that statute codifies a disparate impact liability
regime, which bears important similarities to the theory in the new religion cases. See supra text
accompanying notes 102–134.
168. 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2336 (2021) (describing the case as “involving rules, like those at issue
here, that specify the time, place, or manner for casting ballots”).
169. 446 U.S. 55, 61 (1980).
170. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).
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if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision
are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. 171

Despite that history, the Court did not read the amendment to provide
for a “disparate-impact model” similar to that “employed in Title VII and Fair
Housing Act cases.” 172 Instead, the Court adopted a list of several factors that
courts should consider when assessing a claim under Section 2. 173 The first
was “the size of the burden,” meaning how severe or substantial a voting precondition or requirement was. 174 The second was “the degree to which a voting rule departs from what was standard practice when § 2 was amended in
1982.” 175 That is, “rules in widespread use when § 2 was adopted” are unlikely
to violate the provision. 176 The third was “[t]he size of any disparities in a rule’s
impact on members of different racial or ethnic groups.” 177 Here, the Court
emphasized that because “minority and non-minority groups differ with respect to employment, wealth, and education, even neutral regulations” result
in “predictable disparities” and accordingly do not violate Section 2. 178 Fourth,
courts “must consider the opportunities provided by a State’s entire system of
voting,” that is, the political process as a whole, rather than a particular voting
policy or procedure. 179 Finally, courts must consider “the strength of the state
interests.” 180 There, the Court emphasized that a “strong and entirely legitimate state interest is the prevention of fraud” even though there may not be
evidence that fraud has ever occurred. 181

171. Id. § 10301(b).
172. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2340. Under that model, a state would have had to fulfill a
“necessity requirement” that “their legitimate interests c[ould] be accomplished only by means
of the voting regulations in question.” Id. at 2341 (quoting Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at
1617).
173. Id. at 2362 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Think of the majority’s list as a set of extra-textual
restrictions on Section 2 . . . The list—not a test, the majority hastens to assure us, with delusions
of modesty—stacks the deck against minority citizens’ voting rights.”).
174. Id. at 2338 (majority opinion). The Court said this meant “obstacles and burdens that
block or seriously hinder voting” rather than the “usual burdens of voting” or “[m]ere inconvenience.” Id. (quoting Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198 (2008) (plurality opinion)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2339.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2340.
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The Court’s application of these factors to the two Arizona laws, one prohibiting the collection of ballots by persons other than the voter and the other
prohibiting the counting of ballots accidentally cast in the wrong precinct on
election day, further underscores how little the Court left of any disparate impact standard in the area of voting preconditions and racial discrimination.
For the out-of-precinct rule, the Court found that all of the factors weighed in
favor of the conclusion that the law did not violate Section 2. The Court described “[h]aving to identify one’s own polling place and then travel there” as
merely the “usual burdens of voting.” 182 The Court noted that “it is relevant
that in 1982 States typically required nearly all voters to cast their ballots in
person on election day.” 183 The Court emphasized that the burdens imposed
by the precinct rule were “modest when considering Arizona’s ‘political processes’ as a whole,” 184 beginning its opinion with the observation that “Arizona
law generally makes it very easy to vote.” 185 The Court discounted the fact that
“Arizona leads other States in the rate of votes rejected on the ground that they
were cast in the wrong precinct” 186 because “even if it is marginally harder for
Arizona voters to find their assigned polling places, the State offers other easy
ways to vote.” 187
On the disparity itself, the Court found that the “racial disparity in burdens . . . is small in absolute terms” because “a little over 1% of Hispanic voters, 1% of African-American voters, and 1% of Native American voters who
voted on election day cast an out-of-precinct ballot.”188 That is, “roughly 99%
of Hispanic voters, 99% of African-American voters, and 99% of Native American voters who voted on election day cast their ballots in the right precinct.” 189 So even though the percentage of minority voters whose votes were
not counted (over 1 percent) was twice as high as the percentage of white voters whose votes were not counted (0.5 percent), because the absolute numbers
were small, the disparity was not significant.190 The Court also concluded that
there was an important state interest behind the ballot collection rule, the prevention of fraud, even though there was no evidence of actual fraud. 191 “[A]
State may take action to prevent election fraud without waiting for it to occur

182. Id. at 2344 (quoting Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198 (2008)
(plurality opinion)).
183. Id. at 2339.
184. Id. at 2344.
185. Id. at 2330.
186. Id. at 2344.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2344–45.
189. Id. at 2345.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 2348.
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and be detected within its own borders”; “[f]raud is a real risk that accompanies mail-in voting even if Arizona had the good fortune to avoid it.” 192
For the ballot collection rule, the Court noted that the plaintiffs had not
“provide[d] statistical evidence showing that [the law] had a disparate impact
on minority voters.” 193 Instead, they had relied on evidence including the
number of Native Americans in Arizona who live far from polling places or
mailboxes. 194 The Court alternatively held that “[e]ven if the plaintiffs had
shown a disparate burden caused by [the ballot collection rule], the State’s justifications would suffice to avoid § 2 liability.” 195
b.

Shadow Docket Coronavirus Cases

Also relevant are the constitutional cases decided without argument or
full briefing (and sometimes without explained opinions). The first was Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee, the Court’s
first foray into voting rights during the coronavirus pandemic. 196 In that case,
the plaintiffs had challenged, among other things, Wisconsin’s rules for counting absentee ballots during a spring election that included a presidential primary and a seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 197 As the coronavirus
unfolded, more voters requested absentee ballots. 198 At the same time, because
of the pandemic, the postal service was experiencing delays. As a result, some
voters who requested absentee ballots in a timely manner did not receive their
absentee ballots in time to mail them in compliance with the state’s deadline. 199 In order to avoid a scenario where voters were forced to choose between not voting and voting in person in the midst of a pandemic, the district
court enjoined the state from enforcing the requirement that absentee ballots
be mailed and postmarked by election day (which was April 7 with respect to
ballots that were received by April 13). 200
The district court concluded that, absent the injunction, Black voters
would be particularly burdened by the state’s voting policies. Cities that received dramatically more absentee voter requests and that were experiencing
backlogs in processing absentee voter requests were “more ethnically diverse

192. Id.
193. Id. at 2346.
194. Id. at 2346–47.
195. Id. at 2347.
196. 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (per curiam).
197. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 958–59 (W.D. Wis.
2020).
198. Id. at 961 (noting that one million more voters requested absentee ballots).
199. Id. at 962; Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1210 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that over ten thousand ballots had not even been mailed out the evening before ballots were
supposed to be postmarked).
200. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 976–77.
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than other cities in Wisconsin.” 201 Moreover, as the district court found a mere
month into the pandemic, “African-American and Latino voters are particularly burdened by the impact of the COVID-19 health crisis with respect to
the April 7 election.” 202 That was so in part because of the “digital divide” and
historic barriers to voting online that placed “low-income African-American
and Latino voters” at greater risk of not registering to vote or not requesting
an absentee ballot before the pandemic. 203
In light of those findings, the district court enjoined the state’s rule that
absentee ballots be postmarked by April 7. In the Supreme Court ruling setting aside the injunction, there was no mention of the discriminatory effects
and disparate burdens of the state’s voting policies. The Court merely noted
that “the deadline for receiving ballots was already extended to accommodate
Wisconsin voters, from April 7 to April 13” and that the extension was sufficient to address the effects of the pandemic on voting. 204 The Court also stated
that many Wisconsin voters “have requested and have been sent their absentee ballots” 205—in other words, that other people had no issues complying
with the state’s policies.
The Court doubled down on refusing to engage with the possible discriminatory effects and disparate burdens of voting policies during the coronavirus
pandemic in a subsequent Wisconsin case concerning the general election. 206
In that case, a district court had once again enjoined the state’s rule for when
an absentee ballot had to be postmarked. This time, however, the court of appeals stayed the decision, and the U.S. Supreme Court left the stay in place.
While the Court did not issue an opinion explaining its decision declining the
stay, several justices did. All of the opinions invoked the merits—that is, their
belief that the state’s voting policies were likely constitutional. 207
The two other stay decisions followed a similar pattern, albeit with less
reasoned explanation. In Andino v. Middleton, a majority of the Court elected

201. Id. at 966–68 (explaining that “with respect to Racine, like Milwaukee, . . . approximately 23% of its residents are African-American and 21% are Hispanic/Latino”).
202. Id. at 968.
203. Id.
204. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1207–08.
205. Id. at 1207.
206. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020) (mem.).
207. See id. at 28 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (explaining that “this case involves federal
intrusion on state lawmaking processes” whereas other cases “implicated the authority of state
courts to apply their own constitutions to election regulations”); id. at 28–29 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Elections must end sometime, a single deadline supplies clear notice, and requiring
all ballots be in by election day puts all voters on the same footing.”); id. at 32 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he Constitution principally entrusts politically accountable state legislatures,
not unelected federal judges, with the responsibility to address the health and safety of the people
during the COVID-19 pandemic.”); id. at 33 (“This Court has long recognized that a State’s reasonable deadlines for registering to vote, requesting absentee ballots, submitting absentee ballots, and voting in person generally raise no federal constitutional issues.”).
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to stay a district court decision that had enjoined some of South Carolina’s
voting rules during the coronavirus pandemic. 208 The district court had enjoined South Carolina’s requirement that another individual witness a voter’s
signature on an absentee ballot. 209 Part of the district court’s reasoning was
that “African American[s]” were “at a higher risk of developing severe health
complications due to COVID-19” and that a witness requirement increased
an individual’s risk of contracting COVID-19. 210 The district court also questioned whether the law served the state’s asserted interest in preventing voter
fraud given the kinds of persons who could witness an absentee ballot and the
minimal penalties for absentee fraud, together with a lack of evidence of
fraud. 211
The full U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit left this injunction
in place, 212 with one judge concurring to emphasize that “COVID-19 disproportionately endangers Black and elderly citizens.” 213 The Supreme Court
granted a stay—but not as to “ballots cast before” the stay issued and were
“received within two days of” the order. 214 Only Justice Kavanaugh explained
his vote in this case. And once again, he did so with respect to the merits. Justice Kavanaugh wrote that the Constitution “ ‘principally entrusts the safety
and the health of the people to the politically accountable officials of the
States.’ ” 215
Merrill v. People First of Alabama was the last of the coronavirus voting
decisions. 216 In that case, the district court enjoined the Alabama secretary of
state’s ban on curbside voting in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis. 217 The district court decision noted, among other things, “Alabama’s history of disenfranchisement of Black voters.” 218 “Redeemers” who “recaptured the Alabama
legislature and governorship . . . redrew voting districts to exclude Black voters, implemented at-large elections . . . to dilute Black voting blocs” and “enact[ed] new laws nominally geared toward curbing voter fraud.” 219 Against

208. 141 S. Ct. 9 (2020) (mem.).
209. Middleton v. Andino, 488 F. Supp. 3d 261, 266–67, 307 (D.S.C. 2020).
210. Id. at 297.
211. Id. at 302.
212. Middleton v. Andino, 990 F.3d 768 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (mem.).
213. Id. at 769 (King, J., concurring).
214. Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9, 10 (2020) (mem.). That limitation ensured that
ballots cast while the injunction was in place were not thrown out. Justice Thomas, Justice Alito,
and Justice Gorsuch would have granted the stay in full, thus throwing out ballots that were cast.
Id.
215. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (quoting S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613–14 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (mem.)).
216. 141 S. Ct. 25 (2020) (mem.).
217. People First of Ala. v. Merrill, 491 F. Supp. 3d 1076 (N.D. Ala. 2020).
218. Id. at 1104 (cleaned up).
219. Id. at 1105.
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this history, the district court noted that Alabama’s “absentee ballot reforms
enacted in the 1990s disproportionately disadvantaged . . . rural Black citizens
who historically relied on absentee voting.”220 The district court also noted the
prevalence of racial discrimination in Alabama’s public schools and the health
and healthcare disparities for Black residents in Alabama. 221 And with that
context in mind, the district court noted the higher risks that Black adults
faced from COVID-19. 222
The Supreme Court stayed that decision. 223 The Court did not explain
why; and it accordingly did not grapple with the racial disparities in the coronavirus pandemic or the discriminatory effects of the voting policies. The only
mention of race was in Justice Sotomayor’s closing paragraph of her dissent:
“Plaintiff Howard Porter, Jr., a Black man in his seventies with asthma and
Parkinson’s Disease, told the District Court: “ ‘[S]o many of my [ancestors]
even died to vote. And while I don’t mind dying to vote, I think we’re past
that—we’re past that time.’ ” 224
* * *
With the specifics of these cases in mind, it is helpful to draw out some of
the differences between the cases on racial discrimination and the cases involving religious discrimination and religious liberty. The Court does not
seem interested in the disparate effects of a voting law or policy when the allegation is that a policy discriminates on the basis of race; nor does the Court
seem interested in whether there are somewhat comparable individuals that
are treated more favorably under the state’s voting policies or procedures. In
particular, it does not seem to move the Court that individuals who requested
and received an absentee ballot earlier were able to vote absentee even though
their voting absentee raises equally (unlikely) risks of fraud or election meltdowns as persons who requested an absentee ballot later. Framed in terms of
the equal value theory, in racial discrimination cases, the Court does not require the state to come forward with evidence that the strength of its interest
varies with respect to persons who are subject to the law and those who are
not. Neither does the Court require the state to come forward with evidence
that the strength of interest varies with respect to groups who experience
greater burdens because of the law.
In religious discrimination cases, by contrast, the Court does not even require evidence that religious groups face greater burdens under the law than
nonreligious groups. Consider here Fulton v. City of Philadelphia and Brno-

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
1092).

Id. at 1107.
Id. at 1107–09.
Id. at 1096–97.
Merrill v. People First of Ala., 141 S. Ct. 25 (2020) (mem.).
Id. at 27 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting People First of Ala., 491 F. Supp. 3d at
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vich v. Democratic National Committee. In Fulton, recall, there was no evidence that the discretionary exception process was applied in a way that favored nonreligious entities over religious ones. 225 The process had never been
applied in the context relevant to the case—where the challenge was to the
requirement not to discriminate when certifying foster care families. Nor did
the Court point to any evidence that, were the City to ever use that exception
process, there was reason to think it would result in greater exceptions for
nonreligious entities than religious ones. Even with the absence of any evidence of a disparate impact, the Court still applied strict scrutiny—based on
the Court’s seeming assessment of the prospect of religious discrimination.
Yet in Brnovich, the Court faulted the challenge to the ballot-collection requirement on the ground that the plaintiffs had not supplied evidence of a
statistical disparity between racial groups. And on the challenge to the precinct rule, the Court said the plaintiffs’ evidence of a disparity did not suffice
in part because the disparity was not large in terms of absolute numbers.
B. Identifying Discrimination
This Section discusses two kinds of evidence that the Court has used to
identify whether discrimination has occurred—how well the government’s
justification fits its policy and the existence of societal discrimination or discrimination by private individuals. Again in both instances, the Court has
more freely used these tools in cases of religious discrimination than in cases
of racial discrimination.
1.

Scrutiny of Government Justifications

In the course of ferreting out potential discrimination, the Court has engaged in different levels of scrutiny of the government’s asserted justifications.
Analyzing whether a law or policy actually advances a legitimate objective is
one way to assess whether the policy was motivated by invidious discrimination. If a policy does not further its purported legitimate objective, then that
is a reason to suspect that the true objective may be more nefarious.

225. The Court does not subject all discretionary action that might result in racial discrimination to heightened scrutiny. Instead, it has made it more difficult to challenge discretionary
actions (like peremptory jury challenges, uses of force, charging decisions, and sentencing decisions) even when those discretionary actions result in racial disparities. See, e.g., McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) (“Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process,
we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been
abused. The unique nature of the decisions at issue in this case also counsels against adopting
such an inference from the disparities indicated by the Baldus study. Accordingly, we hold that
the Baldus study is clearly insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in
McCleskey’s case acted with discriminatory purpose.”); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456, 464–65 (1996) (explaining that the existence and scope of prosecutors’ “broad discretion”
counsels against allowing a discrimination claim about selective prosecution to proceed).
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In religious discrimination cases, the Court has required the government
to come forward with more than hypotheticals and generalizations, even generalizations backed up by science, in order to justify its policies. In Tandon v.
Newsom, for example, the Court declared that “the government . . . must do
more than assert that certain risk factors” are present in religious services,
even though that assertion was backed up by experts in disease control.226 The
Court has likewise demanded that the government explore alternative ways to
effectuate its goals. 227
By contrast, in cases raising the specter of racial discrimination, the Court
does not require the same evidentiary support from the government. The
Court does not demand that the government show that a policy actually addresses a real problem. Consider that the district court opinion in Middleton
v. Andino, which enjoined South Carolina’s witness requirement, questioned
whether the requirement did in fact further a valid interest. The court noted
that absentee voter fraud was “an insubstantial problem” and that the witness
requirement “provide[d]” only “ineffectual support towards solving” it. 228
Likewise, the district court opinion in Democratic National Committee v. Bostelmann, which extended the receipt deadline for absentee ballots in Wisconsin’s April election, interrogated the state’s asserted interest in “certainty and
reliability” and “the orderly administration of elections.” 229 As the district
court explained, election deadlines and administration had already been disrupted and “the state’s general interest in the absentee receipt deadline [wa]s
not so compelling as to overcome the burden faced by voters who, through no
fault of their own, will be disenfranchised by the enforcement of the law.”230
None of that seemed to matter to the Supreme Court.
Brnovich illustrates how the Court has not put the same burden on the
state to come forward with evidence that its interest will actually be served by
voting restrictions. There, the Court insisted that states did not need evidence
that fraud in connection with early ballots had actually occurred in Arizona
in order for the state to restrict voting on the basis of fraud. 231

226. 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam); Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1298 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The district court found each of these facts based on the uncontested testimony of
California’s public-health experts.”).
227. See id. at 1297 (majority opinion) (faulting the lower court for not “requiring the State
to explain why it could not safely permit at-home worshipers to gather in larger numbers while
using precautions used in secular activities”); Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141
S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020) (per curiam) (noting that other jurisdictions adopted restrictions less severe
than New York’s).
228. 488 F. Supp. 3d 261, 302 (D.S.C. 2020).
229. 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 975 (W.D. Wis. 2020).
230. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 976.
231. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2347 (2021) (“And it should
go without saying that a State may take action to prevent election fraud without waiting for it to
occur and be detected within its own borders.”).
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Relevance of Private Action

Another equally important trend in the First Amendment cases has been
the Court’s blurring of the boundary between public and private actors. It is
black-letter law that the Constitution’s First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees apply only to state actors; private persons’ activities cannot
violate those Amendments. 232 And yet, in religious discrimination cases, the
Court has relied on statements or decisions by private actors to assess the constitutionality of state action, suggesting the boundary between state and private action is less clear and less significant than the Court’s doctrine imagines
it to be. 233
First consider Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Espinoza v. Montana
Department of Revenue. 234 In that case, the Court held that Montana could not
refuse tax credits for parents wishing to send their children to private, religious schools on the basis of the state’s constitutional provision barring aid to
religious schools. 235 To substantiate that conclusion, Justice Alito pointed to
different pieces of evidence that the original version of Montana’s constitutional provision was motivated by religious bias. First, Justice Alito pointed to
some private citizens who supported the constitutional amendment—members of the Ku Klux Klan. 236 Second, Justice Alito noted that newspaper articles and cartoons published by private citizens in privately run national papers
or magazines evinced hostility toward Catholics. 237 Both of these examples
speak to a national public or societal sentiment not specific to Montana. So
too did Justice Alito’s third category of evidence—the (sometimes violent) behavior of private mobs, again in cities elsewhere in the country. 238

232. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991); Developments in the
Law—State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1255 (2010).
233. While one of these cases, Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, did so to assess
whether there was intentional discrimination, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020), the existence of private
discrimination could still be relevant to assessing claims of unintentional discrimination because
it helps the Court to vary the scope of judicial review based on an analysis of whether the group
faces prejudice. See supra text accompanying notes 52–78 (explaining prejudice strand of political process theory). Of course, private individuals’ statements could shed light on state actors’
motives when they work together. See City of South Miami v. Desantis, 561 F. Supp. 3d 1211
(S.D. Fla. 2021). And there are sometimes difficult questions about when private and state actors
are working in tandem. See Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1923, 1966–74 (2000).
234. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. 2246.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 2268 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that the Ku Klux Klan supported the state
constitutional provision).
237. Id. at 2269 (citing the New York Times and Harper’s Weekly).
238. Id. at 2272 (pointing to “a mob” in New York, “riots” in Philadelphia, and behavior at
schools in Massachusetts).

October 2022]

Disparate Discrimination

45

Next consider how some of the justices have used private actors’ decisions
in broader society as a basis for more carefully scrutinizing government action. Justice Thomas’s statement, joined by Justice Alito, respecting the denial
of certiorari in Davis v. Ermold is instructive. 239 The two observed that “parties” in litigation “have continually attempted to label people of good will as
bigots merely for refusing to alter their religious beliefs” about the validity of
same-sex marriage and same-sex relationships. 240 The two justices also maintained that “those with sincerely held religious beliefs concerning marriage . . . find it increasingly difficult to participate in society.”241 These
happenings in society more broadly counseled in favor of (re)scrutinizing certain state action. Justice Alito’s keynote speech to the Federalist Society Convention in 2020 echoed similar themes. He claimed that “those who cling to
old beliefs” regarding marriage (specifically the belief that marriage is between
a man and a woman) “risk being labeled as bigots and treated as such
by . . . employers.” 242 He also invoked “economic boycotts” as evidence of hostility to religion. 243 So some justices seem willing to attribute private entities’
animus or discriminatory motives to the government and to assess the scope
of societal discrimination against a group when deciding whether laws affecting the group warrant heightened judicial scrutiny.
Here too, the Court has found ways to avoid engaging in a similar analysis
for race discrimination claims. For example, in the litigation challenging Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross’s addition of a citizenship question to the
census, the plaintiffs argued that a private citizen, Dr. Thomas Hofeller, had
been involved in the proposal to add a citizenship question. 244 While the secretary maintained that adding the question was necessary to enforce the Voting Rights Act, 245 in memos, Hofeller observed that adding a citizenship
question “would be advantageous to Republicans and Non-Hispanic Whites”
in redistricting. 246 Although the Court ultimately concluded the Secretary’s

239. 141 S. Ct. 3 (2020) (Thomas, J.) (mem.).
240. Ermold, 141 S. Ct. at 4 (Thomas, J.).
241. Id. at 3.
242. See Justice Samuel Alito, Address at the Federalist Society 2020 National Lawyers Convention (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/supreme-court-justice-samuelalito-speech-transcript-to-federalist-society [perma.cc/2YJW-TFMX].
243. Id.
244. NYIC Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Order to Show Cause, New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com.,
No. 18-CV-2921 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2019).
245. The claim specifically was that DOJ had requested the information so as to better enforce the Voting Rights Act—something the DOJ never attempted to do during Trump’s four
years in office. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2562 (2019).
246. See NYIC Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Order to Show Cause, supra note 244, at 2.
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addition of the citizenship question was pretextual in the sense that Commerce’s explanation for adding the question strained belief, 247 Hofeller’s role
and his hope that a citizenship question would advantage “Non-Hispanic
Whites” did not appear in the Court’s opinion. 248
Nor did the Court, in analyzing the racial discrimination claim in the case
challenging the Trump administration’s rescission of the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals program, consider which private groups or individuals
supported DACA rescission and why. 249 Nor did the Court consider which
private groups and individuals supported the president whose administration
rescinded DACA and why. The Court did not, for example, consider the antiimmigrant and anti-Latino sentiments that were frequently expressed by people supporting President Trump’s restrictive migration policies (such as news
networks that ran stories expressing concerns about how nonwhite immigrants would replace white citizens). 250 Nor did the Court consider the antiimmigrant and anti-Latino sentiments expressed by private citizens at rallies
for the Trump administration. 251

247. Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2575. As the Court explained, pretextual justifications result in an arbitrary and capricious policy that courts set aside under the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 2577.
248. See Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. 2551. For comparison, a three-judge panel representing
a North Carolina state court relied on the Hofeller files to conclude that North Carolina had
engaged in partisan gerrymandering that violated the state’s constitution. Common Cause v.
Lewis, No. 18-CVS-014001, 2019 WL 4569584, at *80, *135 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019).
249. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
250. See Justin Baragona, Tucker Pushes Racist ‘Great Replacement’ Theory Yet Again, ADL
Renews Call for Fox to Fire Him, DAILY BEAST (Sept. 23, 2021, 6:56 PM), https://
www.thedailybeast.com/tucker-carlson-pushes-racist-great-replacement-theory-yet-againadl-renews-call-for-fox-to-fire-him [perma.cc/F4E4-7HN8]; Charles M. Blow, Opinion, Tucker
Carlson and White Replacement, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/04/11/opinion/tucker-carlson-white-replacement.html [perma.cc/N9SV-FXMH]; Joe
Lapointe, Opinion, Tucker Carlson’s Immigration Rants Are Flat Out Racist, OBSERVER (Jan. 26,
2018, 6:38 AM), https://observer.com/2018/01/tucker-carlsons-immigration-daca-rants-are-racist [perma.cc/X8VG-S93J] (noting segments on DACA in particular).
251. See CTR. ON EXTREMISM, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, MAINSTREAMING HATE 36–37,
42–43 (2018), https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/mainstreaming-hate-anti-immigrant-report-2018-v3.pdf [perma.cc/LT62-TKAV]; Philip Rucker, ‘How Do You Stop These People?’:
Trump’s Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric Looms over El Paso Massacre, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-do-you-stop-these-people-trumps-anti-immigrant-rhetoric-looms-over-el-paso-massacre/2019/08/04/62d0435a-b6ce-11e9-a091-6a96e67d9
cce_story.html [perma.cc/A6LZ-JRH9]; Tyler Anbinder, Trump Has Spread More Hatred of Immigrants than Any American in History, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/trump-has-spread-more-hatred-of-immigrants-than-any-americanin-history/2019/11/07/7e253236-ff54-11e9-8bab-0fc209e065a8_story.html [perma.cc/7ZBZLAQB].
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III. A NEW THEORY
This Part offers a theory that can plausibly explain the contours of the
Court’s new jurisprudence. It then evaluates what the Court’s apparent approach to discrimination claims gets right and what it gets wrong.
A. Theory: Social Power, Prejudice, and Grievance
This Section outlines a jurisprudential theory and worldview that can
plausibly explain the Court’s new approach to discrimination cases. It explains
the possible theory driving these cases in part by comparing and contrasting
the Court’s approach to judicial review with the political process theory. Recall
that in Carolene Products, the Court suggested that “[t]here may be narrower
scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality” where “prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities . . . tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.” 252
This Section argues that the Court has either or both broadened its definition of powerlessness (to include groups who are socially powerless) or has
concluded that conservative Christian groups are victims of prejudice and societal discrimination (because some of their beliefs or views have been described as discriminatory). Under either approach, the Court now seems to
view conservative Christian groups as a group warranting judicial solicitude
because the groups lack social capital or because some portions of society are
prejudiced against them. Not much turns on whether the animating theory is
a new definition of powerlessness or a conclusion that conservative Christian
groups face prejudice. As this Section explains, both have similar implications,
flaws, and features.
1.

New Powerlessness and Prejudice

One way of understanding the trajectory of the Court’s cases, which show
greater solicitude for (largely white, Christian, conservative) religious discrimination claims, would be that the Court has adopted a new definition of
what counts as “powerlessness.” Ely, as well as Carolene Products’ footnote
four, had urged more vigorous forms of judicial review for legislation “directed at particular . . . discrete and insular minorities” who face “prejudice.” 253 In the Court’s eyes, it seems, groups are powerless not only when they
lack political power but where they lack social capital, particularly in certain
spaces like elite institutions of higher education or in popular culture. The
252. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
253. Id. Carolene Products had also suggested more careful judicial scrutiny was appropriate where laws violated one of the first several amendments or targeted racial or religious minorities. Id. But whether a law violates the First Amendment now appears to turn on the Court’s
assessment about whether a particular religion has social or political power or faces bias and
prejudice. That can explain how and why the Court treats religious discrimination claims by
different religious groups in different ways. See supra text accompanying notes 25–27, 36–41.
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Court may also believe that social conservatives, especially conservative religious groups, now face widespread societal discrimination and prejudice from
a society that does not adequately respect the group’s views. If social conservatives face societal prejudice, that could be one reason to believe that they lack
social capital and power, which is why the theories are not mutually exclusive.
Both explanations focus on how society treats and engages with social conservatives’ views.
That is where the justices appear to be focused. Consider, for example,
Justice Alito’s remarks to The Federalist Society convention in November
2020. Justice Alito pointed to a blog post written by a Harvard law professor
who had proclaimed that “[t]he culture wars are over. They lost. We won” as
evidence that society does not adequately respect social conservatives’
views. 254 Justice Alito specifically drew attention to how conservatives were
treated at elite law schools: “When I speak with recent law school graduates,
what I hear over and over is that they face harassment and retaliation if they
say anything that departs from the law school orthodoxy.” 255 Justice Alito expressed concern that “those who cling to old beliefs” regarding marriage “risk
being labeled as bigots and treated as such by . . . employers,” again invoking
the specter of how society characterizes and engages with social conservatives’
views. 256 He also invoked the existence of private “economic boycotts” protesting LGBTQ discrimination or racial discrimination as evidence of hostility
to religion and religious believers. 257 All of these statements are about how
certain religions and religious believers lack important social capital and social
power. Justice Alito continued this theme in his 2021 remarks at Notre Dame
Law School when he sought to address criticisms of the Court’s shadow
docket. Justice Alito (mis)characterized private citizens’ (professors and journalists) criticisms as “unprecedented efforts to intimidate the court,” 258 again
indicating an apparent belief that the conservative justices were the victims of
social groups (law professors) who disagreed with them. And in another
254. See Alito, supra note 242. The professor was Mark Tushnet. Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism, BALKINIZATION (May 6, 2016, 1:15 PM),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defensive-crouch-liberal.html [perma.cc/
YUT2-ER9A].
255. Alito, supra note 242. A bizarre manifestation of this worldview is conservatives seeking to suppress counterspeech that is critical of them. An officer of the Stanford Law School
Federalist Society lodged a complaint against a fellow student, putting his graduation on hold,
for circulating a satirical poster that mocked the Federalist Society’s ties to and refusals to disavow the January 6 insurrection at the Capitol. Their complaint alleged that the poster unfairly
insulted them. Mark Joseph Stern, Update: Law Student Who Made Fun of the Federalist Society Will
Be Allowed to Graduate After All, SLATE (June 2, 2021, 5:07 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/06/federalist-society-stanford.html [perma.cc/4FHH-TT4E].
256. Alito, supra note 242.
257. Id.
258. Nina Totenberg, Justice Alito Calls Criticism of the Shadow Docket ‘Silly’ And ‘Misleading,’ NPR (Sept. 30, 2021, 7:12 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/09/30/1042051134/justice-alitocalls-criticism-of-the-shadow-docket-silly-and-misleading [perma.cc/G75V-KRH2].
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speech at Notre Dame Law School’s Religious Liberty Initiative in 2022, Justice Alito identified “hostility” to “traditional religious beliefs” as a challenge
to religious liberty, and “indifference” to religion and a “turn away from” religion as other challenges. 259 These remarks reveal the Justice believes there is
considerable discrimination against conservative Christians, and that conservative Christians are at risk because society no longer shares their values. 260
Indeed, that is how he framed the speech, as about how “to win the battle to
protect religious freedom in an increasingly secular society.” 261
Various statements from oral arguments reflect a similar view. Consider
Justice Thomas’s line of questioning in Americans for Prosperity Foundation
v. Bonta, argued in April 2021. The case concerned a California rule that required charities to report their largest donors. 262 Justice Thomas asked California’s lawyer: “[D]o you think it would be reasonable for someone who
wants to make a substantial contribution to an organization that has been accused of being racist or homophobic or white supremacist, that in this environment that they would be chilled . . . ?” 263 Justice Thomas also posited that
“in this era, there seems to be quite a bit of . . . loose accusations . . . of being a
white supremacist organization or racist or homophobic.” 264 In the same argument, Justice Alito referred to the concerns of “organizations that take unpopular positions,” including the two plaintiffs in the case who are associated
with conservative causes. 265 These statements seem to imply that society is
concerned with racism and racial discrimination to such an extent that the
people who lack social power include those who are accused of racism or homophobia.
The justices have expressed similar thoughts in written statements. In
their statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Davis v. Ermold, for example, Justices Thomas and Alito expressed concern that “those with sincerely
held religious beliefs concerning marriage will find it increasingly difficult to
participate in society.” 266 And in Obergefell itself, 267 Justice Alito seemed to
259. Notre Dame Law School, 2022 Religious Liberty Summit: U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Samuel Alito, YOUTUBE, at 12:17–13:56 (July 28, 2022), https://youtube/uci4uni608E.
260. Id. For a powerful analysis, see Sherry F. Colb, Alito and the Free Exercise of Christianity, VERDICT (Aug. 10, 2022), https://verdict.justia.com/2022/08/10/alito-and-the-free-exercise-of-christianity [perma.cc/2WB8-7VG4]. See also Sherry Colb, Free Exercise in the Mirror,
2 N.C. C.R. L. REV. 67 (2022).
261. Notre Dame Law School, supra note 259, at 26:50–27:06.
262. Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2379 (2021).
263. Transcript of Oral Argument at 82–83, Ams. for Prosperity, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (Nos. 19251, 19-255).
264. Id. at 10.
265. Id. at 53.
266. 141 S. Ct. 3, 3–4 (2020) (Thomas, J.) (mem.); see also id. at 4 (describing arguments
made by litigants).
267. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees same-sex couples the right to marry).
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suggest that the Court’s opinion would result in discrimination against religious individuals and entities that would resemble historical discrimination
against LGBTQ individuals:
[T]he majority facilitates the marginalization of the many Americans who
have traditional ideas. Recalling the harsh treatment of gays and lesbians in
the past, some may think that turnabout is fair play. But if that sentiment
prevails, the Nation will experience bitter and lasting wounds. 268

These statements also provide some clues about the Court’s repeated
choice not to conduct searching judicial review in cases that involve racial minorities. The Court may view racial minorities as relatively more socially powerful. Justice Thomas’s question from oral argument in Americans for
Prosperity signaled a view that society now has little tolerance for racism and
racial discrimination; that is why, in his view, being accused of racial discrimination is so devastating. 269 Or consider the Court’s blithe assertion in Shelby
County v. Holder that “[r]egardless of how to look at the record, . . . no one
can fairly say that it shows anything approaching the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’
‘widespread,’ and ‘rampant’ discrimination that faced Congress in 1965,” 270
which conveys a belief that racial discrimination is no longer a serious problem. At oral argument in Shelby County, Justice Scalia made the following
claims about the fortitude of civil rights statutes and civil rights protections
designed to root out racial discrimination:
[I]t is attributable . . . to a phenomenon that is called perpetuation of racial
entitlement. It’s been written about. Whenever a society adopts racial entitlements, it is very difficult to get out of them through the normal political
processes.
I don’t think there is anything to be gained by any Senator to vote
against continuation of this act. And I am fairly confident it will be reenacted
in perpetuity unless—unless a court can say it does not comport with the
Constitution. 271

This too suggests a belief that persons fighting against racial discrimination possess a kind of capital that other groups may not.
So one way of understanding the Court’s cases would be that the Court is
increasingly attuned to social power and social capital as a measure of powerlessness. Another related way of understanding the Court’s cases would be
that the Court believes that social conservatives (particularly religious social
conservatives) face societal discrimination and prejudice because some parts
of society treat some social conservative views as discriminatory or as enabling
discrimination.

268. Id. at 742 (Alito, J., dissenting).
269. See supra text accompanying note 263.
270. 570 U.S. 529, 554 (2013) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308,
315, 331 (1966) and Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 201 (2009)).
271. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. 529 (No. 12-96).
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The claim that conservative Christians are socially powerless and the related notion that they accordingly warrant some heightened judicial protection does not necessarily depend on whether conservative Christians or
Republicans are actually politically powerful or powerless. Neither the claim
nor the theory depends on a conclusion about that group’s political power.
They are concerned with the group’s social capital and economic power, at
least in certain circles.
2.

Redistributing Social Power

The Court’s cases do more than rest on the apparent premise that conservative Christians lack social power. They also have the effect of preserving
or enhancing societal power for groups they believe are socially powerless or
face societal prejudice. Several of the Court’s cases enable groups to provide
important services, but on terms amenable to them, which increases those
groups’ power in society. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia upheld Catholic Social
Services and other agencies’ ability to continue certifying prospective foster
care parents while refusing to certify same-sex or unmarried couples. 272 (And
Philadelphia had never challenged the agencies’ ability to provide other services, such as foster care.) 273 Masterpiece Cakeshop allowed a goods and services provider to do the same—to retain the economic power and social capital
of being a business owner, but on their own terms, rather than those provided
by the state’s civil rights laws. 274
By allowing goods and service providers to opt out of civil rights statutes,
the Court allows the entities to leverage their economic power to impose their
views on other persons in society. 275 Some goods and service providers’ economic power puts them in a position to dictate the terms of other people’s
participation in society. Take the progression from Griswold v. Connecticut 276
to Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 277 Griswold (and subsequent cases) held
that states could not prohibit people from using contraception.278 In Hobby
Lobby, as well as the Court’s most recent foray into health insurance coverage
for contraception, the Court allowed employers to refuse to provide contraception coverage, despite a federal rule requiring it. 279

272. 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
273. Brief for City Respondents at 4–9, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123).
274. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
275. This is in addition to the important dignitary interests implicated by refusals of service. See Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Supreme Court 2017 Term—Comment: The
Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 157–58 (2018).
276. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
277. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
278. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
279. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania upheld a regulation that allowed employers to opt out of the requirement without even
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As Douglas Nejaime and Reva Siegel have explained, the structure of these
First Amendment-based claims “amplify the material . . . harms that accommodating such claims can inflict.” 280 Given employees’ limited physical or job
mobility, providing employers the power to dictate the terms of health insurance coverage for contraception can alter whether some individuals have
practical access to contraception at all. 281 The same kind of claim, a First
Amendment exemption from civil rights statutes, has also been advanced by
healthcare providers who would refuse treatment or services with which they
disagreed or would refuse treatment for individuals whose gender identity or
sexual orientation they objected to. 282 And the claims might even extend to
“public accommodations, in employment, and in housing.” 283
Even the Court’s coronavirus religious liberty cases have the effect of bolstering religious groups’ social power. In all of the cases in which the Court
struck down public health measures designed to reduce the spread of the coronavirus, the Court concluded that religious entities could not be subject to the
capacity limitations that were applicable to secular organizations. 284 As Kate
Andrias and Benjamin Sachs observed in their article proposing methods to
enable “building and consolidating political power for the nonwealthy,” physical spaces and “gathering spaces, where people are in close proximity, are the
most fruitful locations for social-movement building.” 285 The coronavirus decisions, in other words, facilitated movement consolidation and community
organizing by groups that some justices perceived as lacking social capital.
Other decisions mandate government support—transfers of wealth and
power—to those same groups. Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue

providing notice to the federal government or insurance company that might have facilitated
coverage. 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020).
280. Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2522 (2015). Hobby Lobby was decided on
statutory, not First Amendment, grounds. 573 U.S. at 682. For a constitutional decision with a
similar structure, see Foothill Church v. Watanabe, 3 F.4th 1201 (9th Cir. 2021) (mem.) (remanding in light of Fulton because of possible exemption in state regime).
281. Melissa Murray, Sexual Liberty and Criminal Law Reform: The Story of Griswold v.
Connecticut, in REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE STORIES 11, 31 (Melissa Murray, Katherine
Shaw & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2019) (“[T]he stigma and disapproval that once attended contraceptive use can still be felt—albeit in more muted forms . . . . These insights make clear the limitations of decriminalization as a means of law reform, and underscore the many vehicles, beyond
the criminal law, that the state may deploy in its efforts to enforce a particular vision of sex and
sexuality.”).
282. Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 280, at 2566–74; see also Hannah Murphy Winter,
Ohio Allows Doctors to Deny LGBTQ Health Care on Moral Grounds, ROLLING STONE (July 7,
2021, 4:32 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/ohio-lgbtq-healthcare-1193948 [perma.cc/42AA-4BH9].
283. Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 280, at 2574.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 111–125.
285. Kate Andrias & Benjamin I. Sachs, Constructing Countervailing Power: Law and Organizing in an Era of Political Inequality, 130 YALE L.J. 546, 551–52, 608–09 (2021).
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and Carson v. Makin held that states could not exclude religious institutions
from tax-credited scholarship funds or state-funded vouchers, even when the
funds might be used for religious instruction. 286 Fulton required the City to
provide contracting funds to religious agencies. 287
So the Court seems to be affording more rigorous judicial scrutiny in cases
involving groups that it perceives to be relatively socially powerless or victims
of social discrimination. And the decisions reinforce the groups’ social position and power.
This way of understanding the Court’s cases differs from the accounts that
have been offered by other scholars. Reva Siegel argued that the Court has
developed a set of rules that provide for “majoritarian-enhancing” judicial review that supplies majorities more protections than minorities. 288 She wrote
that the Court seemed more interested in “protecting members of majority
groups from actions of representative government that promote minority opportunities” than in “protecting ‘discrete and insular minorities’ from actions
of representative government that reflect ‘prejudice’ ” 289 Aaron Tang generalized this claim, pointing to other areas of law beyond equal protection. 290 Tang
described the Court as creating protections for the politically powerful, writing that the Court now “afford[s] special protections via underdetermined
constitutional provisions to politically powerful entities that are able to advance their interests full well in the democratic arena.” 291 Tang’s formulation
might not differ significantly from Siegel’s if Siegel’s claim that the Court affords greater protection to majoritarian claims means only that the Court affords greater protection to politically powerful entities that are able to advance
their interests “full well in the democratic arena.” 292
But to say that the Court is affording increased protections to majorities
and the politically powerful may not capture the full picture. The Court may

286. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020); Carson v. Makin, 142 S.
Ct. 1987 (2022). The decisions followed the Court’s decision in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, which held that states had to provide equal access to religious institutions
for non-religiously-related funding (there, surfacing playgrounds). 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 n.3
(2017) (“This case involves express discrimination based on religious identity with respect to
playground resurfacing. We do not address religious uses of funding or other forms of discrimination.”).
287. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
288. Siegel, supra note 22, at 7, 9.
289. Id. at 7, 9, 29–58 (“Today, courts reviewing equal protection challenges to facially
neutral laws brought by members of minority groups proceed under law that directs judges to
defer to representative government, while courts reviewing equal protection claims brought by
members of majority groups strictly scrutinize challenges to affirmative action.”).
290. Tang, supra note 22, at 1454–60 (including the thin protections the Court affords to
criminal defendants and victims of policing relative to the stronger protections it affords police
officers and state governments).
291. Id. at 1430–31 (emphasis omitted).
292. Id.
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be affording protections to groups it perceives as relatively socially powerless—groups that might or might not be politically powerful, but the Court is
not affording them protections for that reason. That is, whereas Siegel maintains that the Court has afforded more searching judicial review to majorities
and Tang argues the Court has does so in cases affecting the politically powerful, in the Court’s eyes, the legislation or policy may affect groups who are
(relatively speaking, in the Court’s eyes) socially powerless.
The Court may also be affording greater judicial solicitude to groups that
it believes face social prejudice—groups whose views are not treated with sufficient respect and groups that are unfairly characterized or stereotyped. Here
too, whereas Siegel and Tang ask whether the Court is supplying more favorable judicial scrutiny in cases affecting majoritarian groups or the politically
powerful, in the Court’s eyes, it may be varying judicial scrutiny based on
whether a group is subject to societal discrimination and prejudice.
These descriptions of the Court’s cases help to supply a missing jurisprudential theory that could explain the trend that Nick Stephanopoulos documented in the Court’s decisions on the law of democracy. 293 Stephanopoulos
argued that the Court’s election law and law of democracy rulings not only fail
to carry out Carolene’s suggestion that there be “more searching judicial inquiry” where “legislation . . . restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation”294 but
also invert that principle as well. 295 In other words, the Court has retreated not
only from the prejudice prong of Carolene but the access prong as well. 296
Stephanopoulos rejected the idea that the conventional modalities of constitutional interpretation (such as text, history, or doctrine) could justify the
Court’s decisions. He also maintained that a theory of judicial restraint could
not do so. Instead, Stephanopoulos posited,
[r]unning like a red thread through the Roberts Court’s anti-Carolene decisions is perceived, and actual, partisan advantage. . . . [I]ts actions are consistent with the recommendations of conservative elites. Both the Court’s
intrusions into, and its abstentions from, the political process also empirically benefit the Republican Party, whose presidents appointed a majority of
the sitting Justices. 297

Stephanopoulos disavowed “psychoanalyzing the Justices” or identifying
“what subjectively motivates their rulings.” 298 But a jurisprudential theory and
worldview that sees social conservatives as socially powerless and/or as victims

293. Stephanopoulos, supra note 22, at 180.
294. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
295. See Tang, supra note 22; Stephanopoulos, supra note 22.
296. Stephanopoulos, supra note 22, at 121–22.
297. Id. at 178, 180 (“Whether or not it consciously drives any Justice’s behavior, it better
accounts for the Roberts Court’s election law rulings than any alternative hypothesis.”).
298. Id. at 180.

October 2022]

Disparate Discrimination

55

of widespread societal prejudice could plausibly be what motivates the rulings
and leads to the results he observes. 299 The idea that the justices believe that
members of the Republican Party, in particular white, conservative (often)
Christians, are socially powerless or victims of rampant discrimination and
are affording them heightened judicial protection for that reason helps to explain why and how the justices are generating rulings that advantage the Republican Party.
B. Evaluation
This Section evaluates the various doctrinal and jurisprudential moves in
the Court’s new antidiscrimination cases. It first explains what the Court’s approach might get right (and where criticisms should not be directed) before
analyzing what the theory gets wrong. It ultimately concludes that the Court’s
two-track system for discrimination claims is unjustifiable.
1.

Partial Defense

This Section discusses two features of the new religious liberty cases that
are commendable. The Court is right to consider economic and social facts
about the world that may be relevant to varying the scope of judicial review,
and the Court’s definition of religious discrimination also represents a welcome shift inasmuch as it addresses real shortcomings with the definition of
discrimination that the Court has used in cases of racial discrimination.
As a general matter, there is much to recommend the idea that, in assessing the degree of scrutiny that courts should apply, one should consider
economic realities and social facts about the world. 300 Indeed, critics have
pointed to the Court’s failure to consider economic realities and social facts as
key defects in some of the Court’s jurisprudence. 301 That is one of the major
claims lodged against the Court’s decision in Lochner v. New York—that in
fashioning a “fundamental right to contract” enjoyed by both the employer
and the employee, the Court overlooked the economic realities that gave employers greater power in contracting than employees. 302
Scholars have criticized modern free speech cases on similar grounds.
Consider McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission or Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta. McCutcheon invalidated a law that established
caps on the overall, combined amount of money that an individual could give
to federal candidates, as well as the caps on the overall, combined amount of

299. See id. at 177–79.
300. Lakier, supra note 29, at 1246–47, 1301–02, 1318–19.
301. Id. at 1318–19.
302. See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Court Sees a New Light, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 4, 1937),
https://newrepublic.com/article/122659/court-sees-new-light [perma.cc/U79R-6VZ9]; Thomas
B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 537–38 (2015).
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money that an individual could give to federal political action committees and
party committees. 303 Americans for Prosperity invalidated California’s requirement that nonprofits report certain large donors to the state. 304 The effect of
both rulings is to give persons or entities with concentrated capital and economic power greater ability to support their preferred political candidates and
(to secretly) support preferred causes. 305 As Genevieve Lakier has argued,
modern First Amendment doctrine, by insisting on formally equal treatment
of all speakers, results in “a powerful sword for reinforcing the power of the
propertied and a shield against government efforts at redistribution.” 306 A
constitutional doctrine that prohibits the government from restricting everyone’s opportunities for speech will result in greater opportunities for speech
by those with greater resources. 307 The same goes for a doctrine that prohibits
the government from attempting to ensure equal access for all speakers: the
persons or entities with the most to gain from government policies that attempt to ensure equality of access are those with less wealth and less power,
who might lack equal access without government intervention. 308
Another way of understanding why social facts and social context can be
relevant to assessing the proper scope of judicial review is to imagine a hypothetical world where there is a disparity between political power and social
power and how that could mean something is amiss on the societal side of the
ledger. Imagine a world in which a majority of the population holds one view
(call it view X), and view X prevails in the political process time and time
again. But the other view (call it view Y) is the view held by the country’s largest and predominant employer who possesses outsized wealth and many more
resources than any other entity. In that universe, view Y might be the view
that is most often heard or shared in society and that society rewards the most
(at the expense of view X). In that scenario, one might think that it is correct
to be skeptical of the landscape presented by the societal side of the ledger
rather than the political one.
So the Court is right, in the religious discrimination cases, to consider
facts about the world that relate to the ostensibly private sphere and private
markets. As the campaign finance examples suggest, moreover, economic and
social distributions of power may be difficult to divorce from political power.
Economic resources can fuel political campaigns and political causes and social capital and social networks can do the same. There is little reason for an

303. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185 (2014).
304. Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021).
305. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Super PAC Contributions, Corruption, and the Proxy War
over Coordination, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 14–15 (2014).
306. Lakier, supra note 29, at 1245; see also Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2121 (2018).
307. Lakier, supra note 29, at 1318–19, 1322–25; Lakier, supra note 306, at 2127–30.
308. Lakier, supra note 29 at 1322–25.
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arbitrary, overly formal separation between political power and various private forms of power, particularly when the two often work in conjunction. 309
A few recent examples bolster the point. Consider the award-winning
journalist Nikole Hannah-Jones’s experience with the tenure process at the
University of North Carolina school of journalism. Hannah-Jones was offered
the position of the Knight Chair at UNC, a position that historically came with
tenure. The journalism school faculty voted to offer her a position on those
terms. Then came emails and phone calls to the board of trustees and board
of governors from a large donor to the school of journalism—Walter Hussman, for whom the school is named. Hussman expressed concerns about the
school associating with Hannah-Jones in light of her work on the 1619 Project,
a media project about the role of slavery and racism in American history and
politics. After Hussman’s misgivings, the board of trustees did not approve
her tenure, and Hannah-Jones was initially offered an untenured position. After news broke of Hussman’s involvement in the appointment process, the
university, under intense pressure, eventually offered her a tenured position,
which she ultimately declined. 310
It would be difficult to sensibly analyze the speech rights at issue in the
dispute without taking into account Hussman’s economic power vis a vis the
university. (After inheriting several newspapers, Hussman gifted the university a $25 million donation that led the school to rename itself the Hussman
School of Journalism.) 311 It would also be a mistake to overlook the social mobilization in support of Hannah-Jones.

309. See, e.g., April Baumgarten, Professor Whose Sex Ed Programs Drew Conservative Ire
to Leave NDSU, GRAND FORKS HERALD (June 24, 2021, 5:34 PM), https://www.grandforksherald.com/news/education/7088333-Professor-whose-sex-ed-programs-drew-conservative-ireto-leave-NDSU [perma.cc/P5AT-4HHK] (noting how “Christian groups, conservative organizations and Republican legislators” organized against an initiative to reduce teen pregnancy in
North Dakota State University).
310. Nikole Hannah-Jones Issues Statement on UNC Board of Trustees Vote, LDF (June 30,
2021), https://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/nikole-hannah-jones-issues-statement-on-uncboard-of-trustees-vote [perma.cc/Y8QK-TPDF]; Kristen Hare, Perspective from the Reporter
Who’s Covered the Nikole Hannah-Jones/UNC Story from the Start, POYNTER (July 6, 2021),
https://www.poynter.org/reporting-editing/2021/perspective-from-the-reporter-whos-coveredthe-nikole-hannah-jones-unc-story-from-the-start [perma.cc/X2H3-UFKU]; Nikole HannahJones Issues Statement on Decision to Decline Tenure Offer at University of North Carolina-Chapel
Hill and to Accept Knight Chair Appointment at Howard University, LDF (July 6, 2021),
https://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/nikole-hannah-jones-issues-statement-on-decision-todecline-tenure-offer-at-university-of-north-carolina-chapel-hill-and-to-accept-knight-chair-appointment-at-howard-university [perma.cc/WM6T-WZJW]; David Folkenflik, UNC Journalism
School Tried to Give Nikole Hannah-Jones Tenure. A Top Donor Objected, NPR (June 21, 2021, 6:05
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/06/21/1007778651/journalism-race-and-the-fight-over-nikole-hannah-jones-tenure-at-unc [perma.cc/5JL9-7DVL].
311. University Communications, Alumnus Walter Hussman Jr. and His Family Make Historic Gift to Carolina, UNIV. OF N.C. CHAPEL HILL (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.unc.edu/discover/hussman-journalism-media-gift [perma.cc/B2AT-7RPL].
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Or consider an example where social mobilization and economic power
effectively shifted the political process. North Carolina was one of several
states to adopt anti-trans legislation in the mid-2010s; after cities adopted ordinances to allow students to use bathrooms consistent with their gender
identities, the state enacted HB2, which required individuals to use public
school restrooms and locker rooms based on the gender listed on their birth
certificates. 312 The public condemnation was swift, and the National Basketball Association announced that it would move the All-Star Game out of
North Carolina if the state kept the legislation. 313 The All-Star Game often
brings in over $100 million in business. 314 Facing popular outcry that included
costly sanctions by an entity with a lot of economic power, North Carolina
relented and repealed the most significant provisions of HB2. 315
Intriguingly, some of Justice Thomas’s writings have signaled some attention to economic and social facts about the world in the context of First
Amendment speech claims related to service providers. In the case about
whether presidents may block persons on Twitter under their personal accounts, Justice Thomas wrote that he believed courts should consider how
“digital platforms provide avenues for historically unprecedented amounts of
speech” and how private ownership of the platforms places “concentrated
control of so much speech in the hands of a few private parties.” 316 These are
social facts about the private sphere—facts that speak to which entities have
what kinds of power relative to others. And they probably belong in an analysis of which individuals or entities enjoy more power relative to others.
The move in the religious discrimination cases to consider social and economic facts incorporates a key insight of the progressive law and political
economy movement, which has challenged public law’s fixation on certain
kinds of inequalities—those that are generated by the state rather than by the
ostensibly private economy. 317 The LPE critique argues that existing constitutional doctrine enshrines the market and private economic arrangements
from constitutional scrutiny and mistakenly views private economic arrangements as entirely distinct from—and entitled to protection from—the state. 318
312. Michael Gordon, Mark S. Price & Katie Peralta, Understanding HB2: N.C. Law Sets
State’s Role in Defining Inequality, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 27, 2016, at 25A.
313. NBA Moves 2017 All-Star Game from Charlotte over HB2 Bill, ESPN (July 21, 2016),
https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/17120170/nba-moving-all-star-game-charlotte-northcarolina-bill [perma.cc/SY4E-VDXJ].
314. Katherine Peralta, Charlotte Looks to Shake Off HB2 Legacy with NBA All-Star Game
Hoopla, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Feb. 14, 2019, at 1A.
315. Id.
316. Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1221 (2021)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
317. Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 29, at 1790–91.
318. Id. at 1807 (critiquing “an expansion of the conception of First Amendment-protected
‘speech’ to encompass certain economic transactions, including protecting advertising, campaign spending, and even the sale of data from regulation”).
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The LPE movement maintains that this is a mistake because economic power
is inextricably linked to, and a result of, how political power has been exercised. 319 And it urges greater scrutiny of superficially private economic relationships and economic ordering. 320
Once the analysis of an entity’s power encompasses economic, social, and
other “private” facts, it is possible to imagine a theoretical universe where private economic power does stifle certain views in society—views that may even
be better, more fairly represented in the political process. Again, imagine the
hypothetical society controlled by oligopoly economic power—where a few
large corporations or wealthy individuals possess 99 percent of the wealth and
own 99 percent of communication platforms. In that universe, if many individuals hold views contrary to the corporate owners and wealthy individuals,
there may very well be a disparity between the views that predominate in the
private sphere and those that predominate in politics—and that may be because oligopoly control dissuades people from expressing or sharing certain
views, because they fear economic or social repercussions. As the North Carolina NBA example suggests, moreover, economic power may sometimes
even be enough to counteract the political process itself.
More generally, the potential relevance of social support or economic
power to a measure of power (or powerlessness) underscores academic concerns about two aspects of political process theory. One is the malleability of
the inquiry into powerlessness. Nicholas Stephanopoulos observed that
“judges and academics have offered widely diverging definitions of group influence, ranging from access to the franchise to descriptive representation to
the passage of protective legislation.” 321 And it is not entirely clear that John
Hart Ely’s account of powerlessness excludes some assessment of a group’s
social capital and ability to participate in society. Ely labeled his theory of political power “participation-oriented,” which could mean people’s ability to
speak and associate, in addition to their casting a ballot. 322

319. Id. at 1791 (“As a result, the economy has receded as a subject in fields now reconstituted as fundamentally political . . . .”); id. at 1792 (“[L]aw specifies the rights, powers, and enforcement mechanisms that constitute economic transactions and, more broadly, economic
ordering. These laws are the output of political order, making law the essential connective tissue
between political judgment and economic order.”).
320. Id. at 1821 (urging scrutiny of “the market power that legal structures enable” (emphasis omitted)); Lakier, supra note 29, at 1246–47.
321. Stephanopoulos, supra note 72, at 1537. As explained above, Stephanopoulos proposed a definition that “[a] group is relatively powerless if its aggregate policy preferences are
less likely to be enacted than those of similarly sized and classified groups.” Id. at 1545. That
theory could well take account of economic and social facts that influence a group’s success in
enacting policies.
322. ELY, supra note 19, at 87. Other times, however, Ely seemed to use political power to
refer to majoritarian democracy and determining policy. Id. at 7 (“[M]ajoritarian democracy
is . . . the core of our entire system . . . .”).
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The second concern is also about the prejudice prong of Carolene, which
called on judges to assess whether a group was unfavorably treated because of
unfair prejudice toward them. 323 Critics charged that this component of political process theory required courts to make substantive judgments about
whether a group was fairly or unfairly treated and whether laws disadvantaging the group were the product of unreasonable prejudice and stereotypes or
instead pursued valid social goals. 324 Michael Klarman specifically urged a version of “political process theory shorn of its prejudice prong” because “there
can be no nonsubstantive theory of prejudice.” 325
The Court’s religious discrimination cases also avoid many of the shortcomings that academics have identified with the definition of discrimination
that the Court has used in cases involving race or gender. Recall the critique
that plaintiffs shouldn’t have to prove discrimination was intentional in order
to prevail: If the government is knowingly creating conditions of inequality,
or if the government is not adequately considering the interests of a particular
group, commentators argued that could constitute discrimination. 326 The
Court’s doctrine on religious discrimination avoids these shortcomings in the
Court’s equal protection doctrine.
2.

Critique and Rejection

This Section focuses on three different criticisms of the Court’s new approach to certain discrimination claims—the first is conceptual-level errors,
and the second is the Court’s application of its new approach. The arguably
most significant flaw, however, is the third: the Court’s selective application
of different doctrinal moves has resulted in an untenable jurisprudence of
conservative victimization that judicially reinforces backlash against new antidiscrimination and egalitarian protections. For these reasons, this Section
concludes the new theory is ultimately unjustified, at least under current conditions.
a.

Theory and Concept

A few aspects of the Court’s new approach to discrimination claims falter
on closer inspection—the Court’s new assessment of powerlessness is artificially crabbed, and its assumption that courts, rather than the political process,
should redistribute social power is also dubious.
First, the theory seems to artificially disaggregate social power, on the one
hand, from political power on the other when both are relevant to assessing
power and powerlessness and the extent of prejudice or discrimination against
323. Id. chs. 5–6.
324. Id. at 153; see Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1094 (1981); Lawrence G.
Sager, Rights Skepticism and Process-Based Responses, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 417, 427 (1981).
325. Klarman, supra note 19, at 784.
326. Litman, supra note 79, at 1–2; Brest, supra note 84; Robinson, supra note 36.
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a group. It would be a mistake to arrive at a conclusion about a group’s power
based largely on indications of social or economic support, such as statements
on social media platforms or public statements by corporations and schools.
Those measures of power are incomplete, just as a measure focused solely on
formal notions of government equality would be incomplete. And yet too often, it seems as though statements by various justices (in opinions or elsewhere) are myopically focused on these measures of power.
Economic and social power are not substitutes for political power, nor are
they equivalent to it, even if concentrated economic power may occasionally
counteract political power. So even assuming the Court is correct in its assessment of the social capital of certain movements or groups, it is mistaken to
stop there without also considering whether those groups have been able to
translate social support into policy outcomes or into electing candidates of
their choice.
Social support and economic power do not necessarily translate into political wins, particularly at the level of enacting a group’s preferred policies. 327
Ely made this observation when discussing a group’s access to the political
process: “If voices and votes are all we’re talking about . . . other groups may
just continue to refuse to deal, and the minority in question may just continue
to be outvoted.” 328 Bertrall Ross and Su Li’s efforts to measure political power
reflect this intuition with empirics; they found that while different groups may
succeed at similar rates when controlling for their size, different groups have
to expend very different amounts of time and capital in lobbying and organizing and publicity in order to prevail in the political process. 329 So merely
measuring social support or economic power will not yield the complete picture when different amounts of social support or economic power may be required in order for different groups to prevail. 330 Summarizing this idea, a
district court in Connecticut, in some of the litigation over marriage equality,
observed that there is “no authority or evidence demonstrating that this ‘corporate power’ has effected appreciable socio-economic or political change”
and that “despite the[] sums raised, gay men and lesbians are still unable to
impact the outcome of legislative processes.” 331 Opponents had argued that
the gay rights movement was politically powerful because it possessed “corporate power” and had access to “significant sums of money.” 332 These arguments were also aired at the Supreme Court. 333

327. Stephanopoulos, supra note 72, at 1554–55.
328. ELY, supra note 19, at 161.
329. See Ross & Li, supra note 74.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 308–314.
331. Pedersen v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 331–32 (D. Conn. 2012).
332. Id.
333. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 108, United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744
(2013) (No. 12-307) (“Chief Justice Roberts: You don’t doubt that the lobby supporting the enactment of same sex-marriage laws in different States is politically powerful, do you? . . . As far
as I can tell, political figures are falling over themselves to endorse your side of the case.”).
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Another way of getting at the disconnect between social power and political power is to consider the role of social protests and public opinion vis a vis
the Supreme Court. Scholars have argued that public opinion and protests can
influence Supreme Court opinions. But is it possible to sustain the kind of
focus and public attention on the Supreme Court that could influence the
Court over a period of several decades, the duration of a justice’s tenure?
Maybe not, which makes social organizing and social capital less effective than
possessing certain kinds of political power.
Second, the Court’s new approach to antidiscrimination law errs at the
level of institutional choice. If any institution should address social or economic inequalities or attempt to redistribute social and economic power in
light of perceived disparities, legislatures or the executive branch seem better
positioned than the courts, at least at the federal level. That is in part because
of each branch’s comparative institutional capacity for factfinding and measuring social capital or economic power. 334 But it is also because of democratic
design—the relatively insulated federal courts are less accountable to the people and the society they would be restructuring. 335 That makes it particularly
problematic for the Court to use its interpretive powers and the power of judicial review to undermine or invalidate legislative or regulatory efforts designed to address disparities.
In addition to the free speech cases discussed above, the Court’s right-torefusal religious discrimination cases are other examples where the Court has
invalidated redistributive efforts. Hobby Lobby, recall, involved a legislative
and regulatory effort to ensure that employers provided health insurance coverage for certain medications—an effort that counteracts the relative bargaining power that employers have in setting the terms of health insurance
coverage. And the Court’s recent free exercise case, Fulton, could be understood in terms of the power that private family care agencies have in structuring or creating families. The City of Philadelphia’s contracting scheme gave
foster care and adoption agencies considerable authority—delegating to them
functions that would otherwise be performed by the government, like placing
children with families. 336 The City’s effort to regulate the agencies’ authority
counteracted the agencies’ considerable social powers to structure and create
families.
To be sure, these examples suggest that the group that has garnered judicial solicitude (conservative Christians) is not politically all-powerful in the
sense that it does not always prevail in the political process. But as the next

334. E.g., William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-Enforcing
and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 887–98 (2013).
335. See, e.g., Nikolas Bowie, Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Written Statement to the Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States (June 30, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Bowie-SCOTUS-Testimony-1.pdf
[perma.cc/ANT9-P9DG].
336. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1875 (2021).
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Section explains, it would be a mistake to conclude from this that the group is
powerless or warrants some heightened judicial solicitude. 337
b. Application
There are also serious concerns with the Court’s application of the new
understanding of antidiscrimination. The Court is probably not accurately assessing groups’ social or economic power, and it is not accounting for features
of the U.S. political system that empower (some) minorities.
First, the Court seems to have a greatly exaggerated view of the economic
and social power of racial minorities and LGBTQ individuals, as well as the
groups fighting to combat racial discrimination and discrimination against
LGBTQ individuals. Consider the allocation of economic power and wealth
in the United States. Recent federal surveys found that “the typical White family has eight times the wealth of the typical Black family and five times the
wealth of the typical Hispanic family.” 338 And a “growing body of research
suggests that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people are more
likely to be poor than are heterosexual people with the same characteristics.” 339 The extreme disparities in wealth between racial groups are in part
because of laws and policies that resulted in the accumulation of wealth in
white communities, underscoring the importance of political power in addition to economic power.
Indeed, by several measures, the Court may also be grossly exaggerating
the extent of social support for addressing racial subordination or rectifying
discrimination against LGBTQ individuals. In Justice Alito’s keynote speech
to the Federalist Society, for example, he repeatedly singled out schools as locations where contrary views were not welcome. 340 Yet consider some important metrics about elite schools: According to federal data, only 2 percent
of professors at doctoral universities in 2019 identified as Black women. 341
Surveys indicate over a third of LGBT youths face bullying or harassment at

337. See infra text accompanying notes 338–355.
338. Neil Bhutta, Andrew C. Chang, Lisa J. Dettling & Joanne W. Hsu, Disparities in Wealth
by Race and Ethnicity in the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RSRV. SYS. (Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/disparitiesin-wealth-by-race-and-ethnicity-in-the-2019-survey-of-consumer-finances-20200928.htm
[perma.cc/Z4B3-7Q65].
339. M.V. LEE BADGETT & ALYSSA SCHNEEBAUM, THE IMPACT OF WAGE EQUALITY ON
SEXUAL ORIENTATION POVERTY GAPS (2015), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Wage-Equality-LGB-Poverty-Gap-Jun-2015.pdf [perma.cc/8Z69-QT4Q].
340. Alito, supra note 242.
341. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHARACTERISTICS OF
POSTSECONDARY FACULTY (2020), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/pdf/coe_csc.pdf [perma.cc/
L2D2-S7CM].
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school. 342 Looking beyond the justices’ fixation on elite schools, there are
higher maternal mortality rates among Black women; lower home appraisals
and loan receipts for Black consumers; and people with “Black sounding”
names fare worse in job applications than white applicants with similar credentials. 343 LGBTQ adults continue to report facing discrimination at work,
in healthcare, and elsewhere. 344 The FBI reports several thousand hate crimes
each year; 345 during the coronavirus pandemic, there were multiple hate
crimes against Asian Americans. 346 It is hard, based on these data, to arrive at
the conclusion that racial minorities or the LGBTQ community possess outsized social capital or economic power.
Second, the Court seems to ignore how various elements of the United
States constitutional system empower the group that the Court insists should
receive greater judicial protection. Recall the example of the hypothetical society where oligopoly control in the private sector suppressed certain views
that were more accurately reflected in political outcomes. 347 That hypothetical
does not reflect the United States political system. For a variety of reasons,
political outcomes in the United States do not neatly measure popular support
for policies or ideas. The most obvious reasons why are the institutional design of both the Senate and the Electoral College, which inflate the power of
less populated states relative to more populated ones. 348 But there are myriad
other contributing factors as well—including gerrymandering that affects the
makeup of both the House of Representatives and state legislatures. Because

342. Ryan Thoreson, “Like Walking Through a Hailstorm”: Discrimination Against LGBT
Youth in US Schools, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/
12/08/walking-through-hailstorm/discrimination-against-lgbt-youth-us-schools [perma.cc/
A5CT-JSSV].
343. David R. Francis, Employers’ Replies to Racial Names, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON.
RSCH. (Sept. 2003), https://www.nber.org/digest/sep03/employers-replies-racial-names
[perma.cc/2ZMA-4G8M]; Jake New, Still at a Disadvantage, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 6, 2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/03/06/elite-college-degrees-give-black-graduates-little-advantage-job-market [perma.cc/D8A5-ST3T]; MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO,
BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH (10th anniversary ed. 2006); ANDRE M. PERRY, KNOW YOUR
PRICE (2020); Gianna Melillo, Racial Disparities Persist in Maternal Morbidity, Mortality and Infant Health, AJMC (June 13, 2020), https://www.ajmc.com/view/racial-disparities-persist-inmaternal-morbidity-mortality-and-infant-health [perma.cc/TRX7-54YD].
344. LINDSAY MAHOWALD, SHARITA GRUBERG & JOHN HALPIN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS,
THE STATE OF THE LGBTQ COMMUNITY IN 2020 (2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/state-lgbtq-community-2020 [perma.cc/Z5Y8-J2PX].
345. Hate Crime Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (2020), https://www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/hate-crime-statistics [perma.cc/8LBG-8BRR].
346. Sam Cabral, Covid ‘Hate Crimes’ Against Asian Americans on Rise, BBC (May 21, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-56218684 [perma.cc/N77M-KZW4].
347. See supra text accompanying notes 308–309.
348. See, e.g., ADAM JENTLESON, KILL SWITCH 10 (2021) (noting that “Senate Democrats
have represented a majority of the American population at every moment in the twenty-first
century so far, regardless of whether they controlled the majority of the seats in the Senate”).
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of the way district maps are drawn, it is possible that the party that wins control over a chamber may not have won the most votes. 349
Moreover, these and other electoral structures in the United States currently give an advantage to Republicans, 350 where “the preferences of white
evangelicals loom large,” since “they remain the largest single religious group
among Republican voters with the power to sway party priorities.” 351 Republicans still control a majority of state legislatures; indeed, they controlled
nearly two-thirds of state legislatures in 2021. 352 They hold more “trifectas”
(control of all three of the state legislature, state executive, and state courts)
than Democrats do. 353 On the federal level, “nearly nine-in-ten members of
Congress identify as Christian,” and over two-thirds of Congress is white. 354
And of course, the same group controls the Supreme Court. At least five of the
six Republican-appointed justices are Catholic. 355 Five of the six are also white,
and five of the six are men.
c.

Selectivity, Grievance, and Backlash

Equally important, the Court has only ever applied its new approach to
antidiscrimination law selectively—it considers some social factors or economic context, but not others. And the selectivity with which the Court has
applied the theory has resulted in a jurisprudence of conservative victimization that instantiates backlash against advances in equity and inclusion. The
theory allows judges to reinforce backlash against new antidiscrimination
protections by insisting that the groups opposed to new antidiscrimination
measures are powerless and accordingly warrant heightened judicial protection. But the idea that opponents of new antidiscrimination protections are

349. Stephanopoulos, supra note 22, at 124.
350. Michael Geruso, Dean Spears & Ishaana Talesara, Inversions in US Presidential Elections 1936–2016 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26247, 2019).
351. Becky Sullivan, The Proportion of White Christians in the U.S. Has Stopped Shrinking,
New Study Finds, NPR (July 8, 2021, 1:12 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/07/08/
1014047885/americas-white-christian-plurality-has-stopped-shrinking-a-new-study-finds
[perma.cc/Z9JQ-WHYU].
352. Partisan Composition of State Legislatures, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Partisan_composition_of_state_legislatures [perma.cc/KPP3-ABTL].
353. State Government Trifectas, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/State_government_trifectas [perma.cc/C297-HJFT].
354. ALEKSANDRA SANDSTROM, PEW RSCH. CTR., FAITH ON THE HILL 4 (2021),
https://www.pewforum.org/2021/01/04/faith-on-the-hill-2021 [perma.cc/J3JK-J8SH]; Katherine Schaeffer, Racial, Ethnic Diversity Increases Yet Again with the 117th Congress, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/01/28/racial-ethnic-diversity-increases-yet-again-with-the-117th-congress [perma.cc/FG5F-7PSL].
355. Tony Mauro, Before the Supreme Court’s First Monday Comes the Sunday Red Mass,
LAW.COM: MARBLE PALACE BLOG (Oct. 1, 2021, 12:47 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2021/10/01/the-marble-palace-blog-before-the-supreme-courts-first-monday-comesthe-sunday-red-mass [perma.cc/D2S7-GFZG].
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minorities warranting heightened judicial protection threatens to undo many
of the new antidiscrimination protections.
This Section explains these facets of the Court’s new theory—one, how it
is selectively applied; two, how it shares some parallels to narratives in politics
and public commentary about conservative victimization; and three, how it
judicially reinforces backlash against new antidiscrimination measures and facilitates the First Amendment steadily devouring them.
The Court only selectively applies the new theory of antidiscrimination.
In particular, it considers some social facts but not others, and the kinds of
social facts it considers lead the Court to favor conservative or Republicanassociated interests. Consider the Court’s treatment of socioeconomic disparities in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, the recent case interpreting the Voting Rights Act. 356 In the course of explaining why voting rules that
have a disparate impact on racial minorities do not necessarily give rise to a
claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Court observed that “minority and non-minority groups differ with respect to employment, wealth,
and education” and that, as a result “even neutral regulations . . . may well result in some predictable disparities.” 357 That observation is about social and
economic facts in the world that, under the Court’s attitudinal orientation in
religious discrimination cases, should have given rise to a presumption that
the plaintiffs had a plausible claim of discrimination—since it provides evidence of exclusion and subordination in the private sphere. But in Brnovich,
the Court made the opposite move: Instead of treating social stratification as
a reason for more searching judicial scrutiny, the Court gave that as a reason
for less searching view. This differential treatment of social and economic facts
in different contexts understandably gives rise to a perception of bias.
These disparities do not mean that the justices are consciously or intentionally making decisions in order to rule in favor of their preferred groups.
Instead, the Court’s apparent theory of social power may be an example of
how background experiences and ideology influence judging or how justices’
jurisprudential views may track the political interests of the party that appointed them. The Court’s doctrine involves an assessment of what kinds of
discrimination are prevalent, and which groups possess the right amount of
power, or fair share of power. The Court’s softening of the rules for plaintiffs
in religious discrimination cases reflects its sense that religious discrimination
is prevalent. The cases rest on the presumption that religious discrimination
occurs with sufficient frequency and perhaps more frequency than racial discrimination.
The fact that this Court would make those generalizations is not particularly surprising. Members of a group will have greater insight into discrimination against that group than they would have into discrimination against

356.
357.

141 S. Ct. 2321, 2339 (2021).
Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2339.

October 2022]

Disparate Discrimination

67

other groups. People are more likely to perceive the existence of discrimination against them or people like them. 358 People are also more likely to view
efforts to hold others accountable or to identify wrongdoers as impermissible
retaliation or unjustified overreactions when those efforts are directed at people who share their views. 359 The rise of polarization may also contribute to
these views—heightened divisions between groups and either–or narratives
may lead people to perceive that opposing groups are more hostile to them
than they are. 360 These dynamics and others may affect the justices’ assessments of a group’s power. And the upshot is that a Court that is represented
mostly by members of one group—Christian conservatives, most of whom are
white—will perceive discrimination against that group and may believe that
group is underrepresented elsewhere. 361
An irony, of course, is that the very group the justices maintain faces this
kind of discrimination is the same group that holds a majority on the U.S.
Supreme Court and has for much of the institution’s history. 362 Nor is the Supreme Court unique in that respect; the same could be said for the history of
Congress, the Presidency, state legislatures, and other political offices. 363 Yet
despite this, the Court maintains that Christian conservatives are powerless
and seemingly at perpetual risk of discrimination and subordination.
The duality has created an appearance of grievance and victimization in
the Court’s new jurisprudence. The Court’s doctrine insists that perhaps the
most prevalent form of discrimination is discrimination that is targeted at a
358. E.g., Evelyn R. Carter & Mary C. Murphy, Group-Based Differences in Perceptions of
Racism: What Counts, to Whom, and Why?, 9 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCH. COMPASS 269 (2015);
Richard P. Eibach & Joyce Ehrlinger, “Keep Your Eyes on the Prize”: Reference Points and Racial
Differences in Assessing Progress Toward Equality, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 66, 66–
67 (2006); Don Operario & Susan T. Fiske, Ethnic Identity Moderates Perceptions of Prejudice:
Judgments of Personal Versus Group Discrimination and Subtle Versus Blatant Bias, 27
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 550 (2001); Joe Neel, Poll: Most Americans Think Their Own
Group Faces Discrimination, NPR (Oct. 24, 2017, 4:45 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2017/10/24/559116373/poll-most-americans-think-their-own-group-faces-discrimination [perma.cc/5NZT-TSVC].
359. Emily A. Vogels et al., Americans and ‘Cancel Culture’: Where Some See Calls for Accountability, Others See Censorship, Punishment, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 19, 2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/05/19/americans-and-cancel-culture-where-somesee-calls-for-accountability-others-see-censorship-punishment [perma.cc/AFC9-KHVC]; e.g.,
Marilynn B. Brewer, The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love and Outgroup Hate?, 55 J. SOC.
ISSUES 429 (1999).
360. PEW RSCH. CTR., POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC (2014),
https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2014/06/6-12-2014-Political-Polarization-Release.pdf [perma.cc/A3Y4-MTCX].
361. Zalman Rothschild’s research about how Republican-appointed judges rule more frequently in favor of these new free exercise claims coheres with these dynamics as well. Zalman
Rothschild, Free Exercise Partisanship, 107 CORNELL L. REV. 1067 (2022).
362. Leah M. Litman, Melissa Murray & Katherine Shaw, A Podcast of One’s Own, 28
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 51, 52–54 (2021).
363. Id.; see supra sources cited in notes 352–354 (describing composition of Congress).
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group the justices belong to and the group that exercises the political power
of the Court. Despite claiming that people with certain views about marriage
increasingly find it difficult to participate in society,364 several of the justices
were selected as justices on the Supreme Court in part because they hold those
views. 365 Even though a conservative Christian ideology may open up political
opportunities, the justices maintain that it renders them (and others like
them) vulnerable to exclusion and subordination. 366
A National Review piece is representative of this narrative and actually
frames its claims in terms that call to mind political process theory. The piece
attempted to depict “political discrimination as [a] civil-rights struggle,” arguing that “conservatives’ resistance to racial, gender, and sexual progressivism mark them as moral deviants . . . leading to pervasive discrimination
against, and censorship of, conservative views.”367 The piece seemed to channel the same idea that seems to be driving the Court’s doctrine regarding discrimination. The author insisted that “in high-status environments,” (which
the author defined to include elite universities, “creative professions” including journalism and arts, and “doctors and lawyers” and the wealthy) “the angle
tilts against conservatives.”368 The piece warned of the threat to liberty and
equal treatment not from government but from societal institutions, and it
argued that aggressive government intervention should be used to reduce
those disparities.
The trajectory of the Court’s cases provides some evidence for critics’
claim that political process theory “demand[s] value judgments” from courts
despite promising that it would allow courts to remain neutral. 369 In particular, the prejudice prong of political process theory requires courts to consider
how often groups should prevail in the political process and also when actions
that affect a group are borne out of prejudice or discrimination.
This reality echoes a note of caution that Melissa Murray raised about one
facet of the Supreme Court’s antidiscrimination jurisprudence—animus doctrine, which maintains that discrimination occurs when the government tries

364. E.g., Davis v. Ermold, 141 S. Ct. 3 (2020) (Thomas, J.) (mem.). For other examples,
see supra text accompanying notes 266–268.
365. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016, at 10 (2016), https://prodcdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL%5B1%5D-ben_1468872234.pdf
[perma.cc/LH5M-GJUW] (“We understand that only by electing a Republican president in
2016 will America have the opportunity for up to five new constitutionally-minded Supreme
Court justices appointed to fill vacancies on the Court. Only such appointments will enable
courts to begin to reverse the long line of activist decisions—including Roe, Obergefell, and the
Obamacare cases . . . .”).
366. Murray, supra note 31, at 281–82.
367. Kaufmann, supra note 32 (cleaned up).
368. Id.
369. Brest, supra note 64, at 131.
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to harm a particular group. 370 Some academics greeted the animus principle
as a welcome shift from what was otherwise a rigid anticlassification principle
in antidiscrimination law. 371 Using the anticlassification principle, the Court
had reviewed racial classifications negatively affecting white people under the
same standard of review that it had used for racial classifications negatively
affecting racial minorities 372 and had invalidated classifications that served benign purposes or remedial aims. 373 As Russell Robinson observed, “when strict
scrutiny appears in the Court’s race jurisprudence today, it is almost invariably on behalf of white litigants” who “wield it to dismantle affirmative action
policies. For at least the last thirty years . . . strict scrutiny has been the principal tool of civil rights retrenchment, protecting whites rather than blacks and
Latinos.” 374
But as Murray argued, the animus principle could be wielded against antidiscrimination measures just as the anticlassification principle could be. In
particular, “those seeking accommodations on religious grounds have sought
to frame themselves as dissenters from majoritarian norms.” 375 And the Court
has enthusiastically embraced that frame—not just in Masterpiece Cakeshop,
where Murray observed it, but in the Court’s more recent religious liberty and
religious discrimination cases as well.
The Court’s doctrine now provides a judicial forum that protects backlash
against legislative or judicial wins by historically disadvantaged groups. 376
When the Court holds that certain kinds of discrimination are forbidden or
presumptively unconstitutional (as in the case of marriage equality), it creates
a group that is newly at risk of exclusion and discrimination—the group who
agreed with or supported the discrimination that the Court (or the political
process) have called into question. That was one of the conservative justices’
criticisms of Obergefell: The dissenters argued explicitly that protecting

370. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (explaining that if “the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest” (emphasis omitted)); see also Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 205; Murray, supra note 31.
371. Robinson, supra note 36.
372. Id.; Siegel, supra note 89.
373. Robinson, supra note 36, at 172–74.
374. Id. at 172–73 (footnote omitted).
375. Murray, supra note 31, at 258; see id. at 281 (“[T]he Court’s approach in Masterpiece
Cakeshop makes clear that the concept of animus may be applied flexibly—and indeed, inverted—to protect a broader range of claimants. With this in mind, what really distinguishes the
vision of animus in Masterpiece Cakeshop from that which is invoked in Kennedy’s earlier animus jurisprudence is the individual who is deemed the object of the state’s antipathy.”).
376. On backlash, see Reva B. Siegel, Community in Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage and Backlash, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1728 (2017).
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LGBTQ equality marginalized those people whose religious beliefs were opposed to marriage equality. 377
The same goes for race discrimination. As Reva Siegel observed, “[o]n one
view—a view some Justices appear to hold—th[e] change in the Court’s role
is appropriate because racial minorities are now the favorites of the law, and
discrimination against them is no longer common.” 378 That was also the
Court’s view during Reconstruction. When the Court held that Congress
lacked the authority to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited
racial discrimination by private entities, the Court wrote, “[w]hen a man has
emerged from slavery . . . there must be some stage . . . when he . . . ceases to
be the special favorite of the laws.” 379 Justice Scalia echoed this line of thinking
at oral argument in Romer v. Evans when he characterized a state constitutional amendment prohibiting antidiscrimination measures protecting
LGBTQ persons in this way: “no homosexual can be treated differently . . . . He simply cannot be given special protection by reason of that status.” 380
In addition to reinforcing backlash, affording heightened judicial protection to groups that were (and still may be) opposed to new antidiscrimination
measures is one mechanism for “preservation-through-transformation.” 381
That phrase, coined by Reva Siegel, describes the phenomenon where the law
formally changes but also materially preserves existing status hierarchies. 382
Affording heightened judicial protection to groups that were opposed to new
antidiscrimination protections is one way to do that, because it will limit the
reach of new antidiscrimination protections by creating exemptions to the
new protections or potentially invalidating them entirely. Indeed, after Bostock v. Clayton County held that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination on
the basis of sex prohibited employees from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, 383 one district court held that portion of Title VII could not be
applied to employers with religious objections to LGBTQ equality. 384 And the

377. See supra text accompanying note 268.
378. Siegel, supra note 22, at 92.
379. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18–19, 25 (1883).
380. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 941039).
381. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of StatusEnforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1119–20 (1997).
382. Id.
383. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
384. Bear Creek Bible Church v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 571 F. Supp. 3d 571
(N.D. Tex. 2021).
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Court will soon consider whether the First Amendment requires certain exemptions from state antidiscrimination measures protecting LGBTQ persons. 385
Take one potential doctrinal implication of the Court’s religious discrimination and religious liberty jurisprudence. For the last several years, particularly as the fight for marriage equality and LGBTQ equality began to see
victories, states enacted laws granting exemptions to religious believers. These
laws purport to provide exceptions from generally applicable statutes to individuals or entities whose sincerely held religious beliefs conflict with the obligations imposed by such statutes. 386

385. 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 142 S. Ct. 1106 (2022) (mem.) (granting certiorari to consider “[w]hether applying a public-accommodation law to compel an artist to speak or stay silent
violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment”).
386. ALA. CODE § 26-10D-5(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2021) (“The state may not refuse to license or otherwise discriminate or take an adverse action against any child placing agency that
is licensed by or required to be licensed by the state for child placing services on the basis that
the child placing agency declines to make, provide, facilitate, or refer for a placement in a manner
that conflicts with, or under circumstances that conflict with, the sincerely held religious beliefs
of the child placing agency provided the agency is otherwise in compliance with the requirements of the Alabama Child Care Act of 1971, Chapter 7, Title 38, and the Minimum Standards
for Child Placing Agencies.”); id. § 22-21B-4(a) (“A health care provider has the right not to
participate, and no health care provider shall be required to participate, in a health care service
that violates his or her conscience when the health care provider has objected in writing prior to
being asked to provide such health care services.”); ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01(V)(a)–(b) (“Government shall not burden a person’s freedom of religion even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability, except as provided [in the following sentence]. Government may burden
a person’s freedom of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: (1) Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) Is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151862(E) (2019) (“A university or community college shall not discipline or discriminate against
a student in a counseling, social work or psychology program because the student refuses to
counsel a client about goals that conflict with the student’s sincerely held religious belief if the
student consults with the supervising instructor or professor to determine the proper course of
action to avoid harm to the client.”); id. § 41-1493.04(A)(1) (2017) (“Government shall not deny,
revoke or suspend a person’s professional or occupational license . . . for . . . [d]eclining to provide . . . any service that violates the person’s sincerely held religious beliefs.”); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-6-305(c)(2) (2018) (“A healthcare provider or healthcare facility may decline to comply
with an executed physician order for life-sustaining treatment form based upon religious beliefs
or moral convictions . . . .”); FLA. STAT. § 761.061(1) (2021) (“The following individuals or entities may not be required to solemnize any marriage or provide services, accommodations, facilities, goods, or privileges for a purpose related to the solemnization, formation, or celebration of
any marriage if such an action would cause the individual or entity to violate a sincerely held
religious belief of the individual or entity . . . .”); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6 (2013) (“Any employee . . . may refuse to accept the duty of offering family-planning services to the extent that
such duty is contrary to such employee’s personal religious beliefs . . . .”); IDAHO CODE § 18611(2) (2016) (“No health care professional shall be required to provide any health care service
that violates his or her conscience.”); IND. CODE § 25-17.3-5-2.5(b) (2022) (“A genetic counselor
may not be required to: (1) perform; (2) participate in; or (3) provide; a service that violates any
sincerely held ethical, moral, or religious belief held by the genetic counselor.”); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-5322(b)–(c) (2005) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of state law, and to the extent
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The Court’s jurisprudence—and specifically its proclivity to find that government officials discriminated on the basis of religion—supplies a potential
justification for these statutes. Statutes granting religious exemptions could be
(and have been) challenged on the ground that they result in disparities or
hardships on individuals who would otherwise be protected by the antidiscrimination measure. 387 In order to justify those results, the state may need to
point to a compelling justification. 388 The prevalence of religious discrimina-

allowed by federal law, no child placement agency shall be required to perform, assist, counsel,
recommend, consent to, refer or otherwise participate in any placement of a child for foster care
or adoption when the proposed placement of such child would violate such agency’s sincerely
held religious beliefs. . . . No child placement agency shall be denied a license, permit or other
authorization, or the renewal thereof, or have any such license, permit or other authorization
revoked or suspended by any state agency, or any political subdivision of the state solely because
of the agency’s objection to performing, assisting, counseling, recommending, consenting to,
referring or otherwise participating in a placement that violates such agency’s sincerely held religious beliefs.”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.20 (2016) (conscience in healthcare protection);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.124e (West 2019) (exemptions for private child-placing agencies); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-62-1 to 11-62-19 (2019) (“Protecting Freedom of Conscience from
Government Discrimination Act”); MO. REV. STAT. § 191.724 (2016) (health insurance); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-33-105 (2021) (protecting free exercise of religion); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-5.5(a)
(2021) (“Every magistrate has the right to recuse from performing all lawful marriages under
this Chapter based upon any sincerely held religious objection.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-12-07.1
(2018) (“A child-placing agency is not required to perform, assist, counsel, recommend, facilitate, refer, or participate in a placement that violates the agency’s written religious or moral convictions or policies.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.024(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022)
(exceptions to housing discrimination); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-8-112 (West Supp. 2022)
(exemptions for private child-placing agencies); S.C. Exec. Order No. 2018-12, 42 S.C. Reg. 5
(Apr. 27, 2018) (foster care); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-6-39 (Supp. 2022) (“[The s]tate may not
take adverse action against [a] child-placement agency acting on [the] basis of sincere written
religious policy.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-147(a) (2021) (“[N]o private licensed child-placing
agency shall be required to perform, assist, counsel, recommend, consent to, refer, or participate
in any placement of a child for foster care or adoption when the proposed placement would
violate the agency’s written religious or moral convictions or policies.”); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE
ANN. § 45.009(a) (West 2019) (exempting child welfare services); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-3012 (LexisNexis 2021) (conscience exemption for healthcare providers); id. § 33-16E-7 (LexisNexis 2017) (religious exemption for employers).
387. See, e.g., Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 280, at 2538–42, 2552–65 (outlining how religious exemptions burden individuals otherwise protected by statute); Adrianne M. Spoto, Note,
Fostering Discrimination: Religious Exemption Laws in Child Welfare and the LGBTQ Community, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296 (2021); Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677 (S.D. Miss. 2016) (enjoining Mississippi’s HB 1523), rev’d, 860 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2017).
388. E.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018)
(“Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as
social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth. . . . The exercise of their freedom on terms
equal to others must be given great weight and respect by the courts.”); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 761–67 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (requiring government to
show a compelling reason for allowing employers to refuse to offer insurance for contraception);
id. at 728 (majority opinion) (assuming “that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the
four challenged contraceptive methods is compelling within the meaning of RFRA”); Grutter v.
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tion could provide one such justification. If religious discrimination is widespread and likely to occur, even from generally applicable laws, then state laws
that prophylactically exempt individuals or entities from generally applicable
laws seem more justified. The doctrine reinforces the states’ argument that
exemptions are needed in order to guard against a risk of religious discrimination or unconstitutional state action.
In the abstract, the Court is probably right to consider economic and social facts about the world. But the selectivity with which the Court does so and
the Court’s poor assessment of the social power of various groups has created
a jurisprudence of victimization and backlash that make the Court’s two-track
system ultimately unjustifiable. It cannot be that a group that, at minimum, is
poised to control one of the three branches of the federal government for decades can maintain a persistent story of victimization—justifying the aggregation of more authority and more power.
CONCLUSION
The developments in the Free Exercise Clause parallel developments in
the Equal Protection Clause over the last several decades. In particular, Reva
Siegel and Russell Robinson, among others, have argued that the Court’s embrace of the anticlassification theory for the Equal Protection Clause has made
it easier for white plaintiffs to win racial discrimination claims than for racial
minorities to do so. 389 The shifts in the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence,
and the theory motivating those shifts, this Article has suggested, will make it
easier for conservative Christian groups to succeed on free exercise claims
than for other minority religions to do so.
One key premise of the Court’s apparent theory is that (conservative,
Christian) religious believers face widespread discrimination—discrimination
that may be more prevalent than racial discrimination, such that it is appropriate to presume that a policy’s discriminatory effects were the result of discrimination in cases involving religion but not in cases involving race.
That premise and the various doctrinal moves that implement it can be
understood by way of a contrast to political process theory. Political process
theory called for more aggressive forms of judicial review where legislation
negatively affected politically powerless groups of discrete and insular minorities who faced prejudice. The Court seems to be of the view that courts should
more carefully review legislation that negatively affects groups that are socially
powerless and that social conservatives are one such group. The Court may
also be of the view that social conservatives face widespread societal prejudice
and should be afforded judicial solicitude for that reason as well. This new
orientation toward religious discrimination claims seems to maintain that a
group can be politically powerful—not only winning elections but having its
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (requiring government to show a compelling interest for discrimination on the basis of race); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (requiring government to show an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for discrimination on the basis of sex).
389. Siegel, supra note 22, at 92; Robinson, supra note 36.
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policy preferences enacted in the political process, including the courts—but
still be powerless because they lack certain kinds of social capital and face certain kinds of societal prejudice.
While some parts of the Court’s new approach to religious discrimination
claims have things to recommend them, the current shape and application of
the theory is problematic and ultimately unjustified. The Court may be right
to consider social context, economic power, and related facts in assessing a
group’s power. But it is wrong to ignore the importance of political power and
the rules that allocate it, and it is wrong to think that the Court should be the
institution to recalibrate society and redistribute power to groups that it perceives as socially powerless. The Court has also created a jurisprudence of conservative grievance and backlash that threatens to undo new egalitarian,
antidiscrimination protections.
Appreciating how the Court has applied its new theory of religious discrimination, as well as how the Court’s new theory relates to political process
theory, invites questions about whether the problem is the theories themselves
or the Court’s application of them. That is, is the Court’s new account of discrimination theoretically attractive but the Court’s application of it just mistaken? Separating a theory from its application is a difficult task. There are,
however, at least two reasons to doubt whether the Court’s new theory of discrimination belongs in free exercise jurisprudence. One is that the only Supreme Court cases to ever apply this theory suggest it is not judicially
administrable. Courts are loosely equating activities that are not comparable,
raising questions about whether they are competent to make such assessments. The second problem is that, as Section II.A explained, the theory itself
seems to invite courts to assess the relative importance of religious exercise
compared to other activities.
One can ask a similar question about political process theory, or at least
the prejudice prong of political process theory. If the Court’s free exercise
cases are rooted in the idea that courts should afford heightened judicial solicitude to groups that are powerless because they face prejudice and bias, is
that an indictment of the theory itself, or is the problem the Court’s application of the theory? The Court’s free exercise cases provide some additional
fodder for critics of Ely’s prejudice prong who have expressed concern that
the theory would result in courts picking and choosing between groups in unprincipled ways and ultimately favoring their preferred causes and groups.390
Whether that is enough to abandon the theory or even just the prejudice
prong, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.

390.

Klarman, supra note 19, at 748, 819; Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 78.

